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OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
James V. Hammett, Jr. *
Deborah Essig Taylor**
HIS Article' focuses on the interpretations of, and the changes to, oil,
gas, and mineral law in Texas.2 The Article examines judicial devel-
opments, 3 including decisions by both the Texas courts and the Fifth
Circuit court of appeals. The Article also highlights applicable Texas legis-
lative enactments4 relating to oil, gas, and mineral law.5
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
1. Reservation of Minerals
In Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. United States6 Temple-Inland
deeded approximately 77,000 acres to the United States, reserving minerals
as to 59,938 acres. By its terms, the mineral estate reservation terminated in
1985, except for a one-half-mile radius surrounding twenty-two commer-
cially producing sites. Those twenty-two sites received a five-year extension
of reservation and were entitled to further five-year extensions so long as
commercial operations were being carried on at the end of any extension
period. At the end of the first five-year extension, six of the twenty-two
tracts were still producing in commercial quantities. Beginning January 1,
1990, the United States elicited public bids for leases on all of the acreage
except the six sites then producing in commercial quantities.
The Fifth Circuit was called upon to construe the language of the deed to
determine the duration of the mineral reservation. 7 The United States con-
tended that the deed expressed an intent to terminate the mineral reservation
as to each individual tract that had no commercial operations at the end of a
SB.A. and J.D., University of Texas
•* B.A., University of Kentucky, J.D., University of Louisville Law School
1. Recognition goes to C. Denise Dillard, an associate of Scott, Douglass & Luton,
L.L.P., (B.A.T. and M.A. Sam Houston State University, and J.D., University of Houston
Law Center) for her contribution to this article.
2. The article is devoted exclusively to Texas law.
3. See infra pp. 1439-73.
4. See infra pp. 1473-82.
5. Following former SMU annual surveys of Texas oil, gas, and mineral law, this Article
utilizes headings and subheadings that provide easy access to the individual issues examined.
See, e.g., Stuart C. Hollimon & Robert E. Vinson, Jr., Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1591 (1993).
6. 988 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1993).
7. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the question de novo.
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five year period. Temple-Inland contended that the deed expressed an intent
to reserve the mineral rights as to all tracts created in 1985 until no opera-
tions were conducted on any tract. The court first noted that "interpreting
an unambiguous contract presents a question of law, including determining
whether the contract is ambiguous."' 8 Citing Prairie Producing Co. v.
Schlachter,9 the court held that "[a]n instrument is ambiguous only when
the application of pertinent rules of construction leaves it genuinely uncer-
tain which one of two reasonable meanings is the proper one."10 Following
standard canons of construction," the deed was held to be unambiguous.12
The Fifth Circuit construed the deed in favor of the United States, holding
that the use of the plural "reservations" in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the deed,
instead of the singular, manifested an intent to create a discrete reservation
as to each tract created in 1985, rather than a single collective reservation.13
The court also noted that there was no clear language reserving the mineral
rights to tracts created in 1985 which were without production in commer-
cial quantities five years later, holding that the rule that a reservation of
mineral interest must be clearly stated "applies not only to whether a reser-
8. Temple-Inland, 988 F.2d at 1421 (quoting REO Indus., Inc. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 932 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted)).
9. 786 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
10. Temple-Inland, 988 F.2d at 1421 (quoting Prairie, 786 S.W.2d at 413).
11. Those canons include: (i) ascertaining the intent of the parties (Humble Oil & Refin-
ing Co. v. Kirkindall, 119 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1938), afj'd, 145
S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. 1941)); (2) applying the "four corners" rule (Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d
459, 461 (Tex. 1991)); (3) construing the language of the instrument against the grantor (State
v. Dunn, 574 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd, n.r.e.)); and (4)
requiring a reservation to be "stated in clear language" (Temple-Inland, 988 F.2d at 1422
(citing Sharp v. Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1952)).
12. Temple-Inland, 988 F.2d at 1422.
13. The pertinent deed provisions are:
[1] There is hereby excepted and reserved from the foregoing sale and convey-
ance all the oil, gas and other valuable minerals deposited on, in or under said
lands, in accordance with the following causes, rules and regulations, to-wit:
[2] Reserving to the vendor, its successors and assigns, for the period ending
January 1, 1985, the right to prospect for, mine, and remove any and all gas, oil
and mineral deposits on, in, or under said lands. The vendor, its lessees, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall have at any and all times full right to enter upon said
lands for the purposes of prospecting for, mining, and removing gas, oil, and
minerals.
[3] It is further provided that if on January, 1, 1985, gas, oil and/or minerals
are being produced on said land in commercial quantities, then and in that event
the gas, oil and mineral reservations shall be extended on all areas within a one-
half mile radius of each then existing gas or oil well or mineral operation. Such
extension of gas, oil and mineral reservation shall run for a five year period from
date of January 1, 1985.
[4] Provided further that said gas oil, and mineral reservations shall be ex-
tended by five year periods so long as commercial operations are being carried
on at the end of the then current extension period.
[5] It is provided that at the end of the termination of the period ending Janu-
ary 1, 1985, if not as above provided extended, or at the termination of any
extended period, if no commercial gas, oil or mineral operations are being car-
ried on, then and in that event the right of the vendor, its lessees, successors and
assigns to prospect for, mine and remove gas oil, and minerals shall terminate.
Temple-Inland, 988 F.2d at 1420-21.
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vation was created, but to its endurance and termination." 14
The Fifth Circuit distinguished dicta in Williamson v. Federal Land
Bank,15 holding that production from any one of four non-contiguous tracts
of land would permanently vest a non-participating royalty interest in all
four tracts, where the deed reserving the royalty interest provided for the
interest to permanently vest if mineral production occurred within twenty
years.' 6 The court reasoned that the Williamson deed contained a single
reservation governing all tracts, unlike the deed executed by Temple-Inland,
which was held to provide that separate tracts of land were subject to sepa-
rate reservations. 17 Finally, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply rules inter-
preting habendum clauses in oil and gas leases to a reservation provision in a
deed. 18 Although the court agreed that a deed conveying a determinable
interest and a mineral lease creates estates subject to the same principles of
Texas law, 19 it noted that Temple-Inland's deed did not convey a determina-
ble interest, but instead reserved one.20
2. Assignments of Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases
In OTC Petroleum Corp. v. Brock Exploration Corp. 21 the Amarillo Court
of Appeals considered whether an assignment of interests in certain oil and
gas leaseholds also conveyed an accrued, but uncollected, take-or-pay
payment.
By assignment dated June 14, 1989, Brock Oil and Gas Corporation 22
assigned to OTC Petroleum Corporation "All of [Brock's] right, title and
interest in and to the oil, gas and mineral leases ... and the Jones 25-406-1
Well, and the Jones 25-406-2 Well . . . INSOFAR AS SAID LEASES
COVER RIGHTS BETWEEN THE SURFACE OF THE EARTH AND
THE BASE OF THE CHESTER FORMATION...." The assignment
also included
[a]ll of [Brock's] rights in, to, under or derived from all agreements and
contractual rights ... relating to the SUBJECT INTERESTS, includ-
ing production sales contracts . . . purchase, exchange or processing
agreements, casinghead gas contracts ... and all other contracts, agree-
ments and instruments relating to the exploration for production, stor-
age, treatment, transportation, processing, or sale or disposal of oil, gas
14. Id. at 1423-24 (citing Guaranty Nat'l Bank & Trust v. May, 513 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ)).
15. 326 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ refd n.r.e).
16. Temple-Inland, 988 F.2d at 1424.
17. Id.
18. Id. Temple-Inland argued that under an habendum clause in a lease, production on
one tract will hold the lease as to all tracts conveyed, citing Hillequst v. Amerada Petroleum
Corp., 282 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Id. at 1425 (citing Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 159 Tex. 560, 323 S.W.2d 944, 948
(1959)).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. 835 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
22. Brock Oil and Gas Corporation was the managing general partner for Brock Explora-
tion Corporation 1979-1, Ltd.
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and other hydrocarbons .... 23
Prior to the assignment to OTC, Brock and Northern Natural Gas Company
entered into a gas purchase contract with a take-or-pay clause relating to the
Jones Wells. Before the effective date of the assignment, Northern became
obligated to pay, but had not yet paid, a take-or-pay amount of $38,000.00.
The parties agreed the 1989 assignment from Brock to OTC included the
gas purchase contract with Northern and that the assignment was unambig-
uous. The parties did not agree, however, as to the ownership of the accrued
$38,000.00 take-or-pay amount. Reversing the trial court and rendering, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals held that although the accrued take-or-pay
amount was personalty, which would not pass in the assignment of an oil
and gas lease absent an express provision,24 the assignment included con-
tractual rights derived from contracts relating to the sale of gas.25 There-
fore, the take-or-pay claim was conveyed expressly and without
qualification. 26
The court noted the reliance of both parties on East Texas Refining Co. v.
Helvir Oil Co. 27 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 28 stating that the cases
were instructive but not controlling.29 The court distinguished those cases
on the grounds that the assignments therein, unlike the assignment from
OTC to Brock, did not expressly convey any personalty unrelated to the
extraction process. 30
B. OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LEASES
1. Surface/Mineral Relationship
In Farm Credit Bank v. Colley 3' the Texarkana Court of Appeals was
called upon to determine whether Farm Credit Bank, a non-participating
royalty owner, was entitled to royalties from the mining of surface lignite.3 2
Farm Credit Bank's title was derived from a reservation of 1/16th royalty
interest in "all of the oil, gas, and all other minerals in, to, on and under and
that may be produced from the land."' 33 The Colley's deed stated that the
conveyance was subject to "all outstanding minerals and/or royalties of rec-
23. OTC Petroleum Corp., 835 S.W.2d at 793.
24. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 930 (1975)).
25. Id. at 795.
26. Id.
27. Id. 82 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (holding
that the mere assignment of an oil and gas lease and all property incident to such lease does not
transfer oil runs sold and delivered from the lease before the date of the assignment).
28. 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (holding that a right to
suspense money or other personalty unrelated to the production of oil and gas was not con-
veyed by an assignment of oil and gas leases, together with all personal property and equip-
ment used or obtained in connection therewith and located thereon).
29. OTC Petroleum Corp., 835 S.W.2d at 795.
30. Id.
31. 849 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
32. The trial court entered summary judgment that a royalty interest does not include
surface lignite. Id. at 826.
33. Id.
1442 [Vol. 47
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ord. '" 34 Both parties claimed the right to royalties from the strip-mining of
lignite.
Holding that Farm Credit Bank was not entitled to royalties on lignite,
the court cited a series of Texas Supreme Court cases in support of two rules:
(1) the phrase "and other minerals" in a severance of the mineral estate from
the surface estate does not include substances which, if mined, would
threaten the existence of the surface estate; and (2) lignite within 200 feet of
the surface is, as a matter of law, part of the surface estate.35 The court held
that a "reservation or conveyance between private parties that covers any
interest in the oil, gas, and other minerals does not include near surface lig-
nite unless the instrument creating such interest expressly provides other-
wise."' 36 The rules are based upon the presumed general intent that a surface
owner would not consent to a reservation or conveyance of a mineral which
requires the destruction of the surface to mine.37
The court noted a disagreement among the courts of appeals as to whether
the nonparticipating royalty interests are part of the mineral estate and sub-
ject to the same rules as other mineral interests, given that nonparticipating
royalty owners have no right to disturb the surface by mining operations. 38
In holding that nonparticipating royalty interests are interests in land and
part of the total mineral estate, subject to the same rules as any other min-
eral interest, the court followed its own previous case, 39 and the holdings of
the San Antonio and Austin Courts of Appeals.40 The court expressly re-
jected the ruling of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Martin v. Schnei-
der 4' that a royalty interest does not share the ownership traits of a mineral
fee interest and should not be treated as such.42 The court expressed con-
cern that if it were to apply rules "to some mineral interests and not to
others on the basis of the presumed intent of specific owners, we [would]
create untold confusion in land titles ... and produce bizarre results, e.g., a
nonparticipating royalty owner having a greater estate than that of his gran-
tor who owned the full mineral estate."'43
The Tyler Court of Appeals, in Barfield v. Holland,44 considered whether
the purchasers of three 33-1/3 acre tracts of land, partitioned from a 100-acre
34. Id.
35. Id. at 826-27 (citing Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986); Friedman v. Tex-
aco, 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985); Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984); Reed
v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977); Acker v.
Gwinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971)).
36. Id. at 827 (citing Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986)).
37. Farm Credit, 849 S.W.2d at 827.
38. Id.
39. Hobbs v. Hutson, 733 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ denied).
40. Farm Credit, 849 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Storm Associates v. Texaco, 645 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ)).
41. 622 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. Farm Credit, 849 S.W.2d at 827.
43. Id.
44. 844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
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tract, obtained title to 100% of the minerals underlying those tracts. 45 The
court examined a complex series of conveyances and cross-conveyances be-
tween three undivided cotenants in the surface and minerals of a 100-acre
tract of land. 46 In each conveyance between the cotenants, the grantor re-
served an undivided interest in the mineral estate, conveying surface rights
only to the grantees.
The Tyler Court of Appeals found that the result of the conveyances and
cross-conveyances was a severance of the mineral estate from the surface
estate and a partition of the surface into three separate 33-1/3 acre tracts.47
The mineral estate, however, remained intact and undivided with respect to
the entire 100-acre tract. Subsequently, each of the three cotenants con-
veyed his or her 33-1/3 acre tract to the plaintiffs by general warranty deed
without any mineral estate reservations. The plaintiffs claimed title to 100%
of the surface and 100% of mineral estate for each tract. The court dis-
agreed, holding that because there had been no partition of the mineral es-
tate, each grantor had owned, and could therefore convey to plaintiffs, all of
the surface of each separate tract but only a one-third undivided interest in
the minerals underlying each separate tract.48
The Tyler court of appeals refused to apply the equitable partition doc-
trine to vest plaintiffs with 100% of the minerals. 49 The court first noted
that the parties had not found a Texas case that precisely defined the doc-
trine, 50 and then held that the doctrine "applies uniformly to the conveyance
of the surface estate as well as to the mineral estate:" 5'
The doctrine of equitable partition applies only to an adjustment of eq-
uities between the cotenants themselves. When there has been a sever-
ance of the mineral estate from the surface estate by the cotenants, as is
the case here, a purchaser who purchases the larger tract, by accepting
separate deeds conveying separate tracts of land out of the larger tract,
each described by metes and bounds, from the cotenants who had, in
legal effect, partitioned the surface of the larger tract, and reserved the
mineral under the partitioned tracts, cannot be awarded the entire min-
eral estate on, in and under the larger tract .... To put it differently,
... [the purchasers] cannot compel the adjustment of other equities
owned by the former cotenants in order for them to acquire what they
thought they had purchased.52
45. Id.
46. Id. at 760-63. The 294th Judicial District Court of Wood County, Texas entered
judgment that the purchasers held both the surface estate and the mineral estate. Id. at 760-
61.
47. Id. at 764.
48. Id. at 761.
49. Id. at 763 (hereinafter doctrine).
50. Id. The plaintiffs cited the following as "'essential elements of the ... doctrine ...
I) a conveyance of a specific tract of the common property; 2) the nonjoinder of all cotenants
in the conveyance; and 3) the treatment of the common property including specific tracts as
having equal value.' " Id.
51. Id. (citing Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Co., 132 Tex. 413, 123 S.W.2d
290, 300 (1939)).
52. Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (noting further that "[fthe courts of this State have re-
fused to apply the doctrine of equitable partition between different tracts of land owned by the
1444 [Vol. 47
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Since the purchasers sued their grantors to establish title, and not to estab-
lish equities between cotenants, the doctrine of equitable partition was not
applicable.53
Similarly, the Tyler Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
their grantors had ratified and acquiesced in their title to 100% of the miner-
als.54 The court reasoned that the doctrines of ratification and acquiescence
applied only where a "non-joining cotenant electing to recognize or ratify
the act of his cotenant who has attempted to convey a specific part of the
common property to another.""5 The court also rejected the argument that
the grantors could be estopped to deny plaintiffs' ownership of 100% of the
minerals by virtue of misrepresentations to plaintiffs concerning the title
conveyed to them, stating, without citation, that "[1]and titles are governed
by notice imparted by the deeds in the chain of title, duly recorded in the
public records of the county where the land is situated, and not by personal
representations, warranties, reliance, and estoppel.... 56
Finally, the Tyler Court of Appeals refused to apply the doctrine of ad-
verse possession to the purchasers' favor, holding that "occupation of land
under a chain of title which contains a mineral reservation is not adverse to
the reserved minerals." T57 The purchasers failed to prove their adverse pos-
session claim because neither they, nor their predecessors-in-interest, had
"possessed" the minerals by actually taking them and producing them from
the ground for the statutory period.58
Affirming and extending its decision in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,59 the Texas
Supreme Court applied the "accommodation doctrine" in Tarrant County
Water Control & Improvement District Number One v. Haupt, Inc. 6 to de-
termine whether a governmental agency had taken a mineral estate by an
inverse condemnation when it restricted the use of the surface by the mineral
owner and lessee. 61 The court described the accommodation doctrine62 as a
means to balance the rights of the surface owner and the mineral owner in
the use of the surface.63 Where mining the minerals would preclude or im-
pair the existing use of the surface, the mineral owner may be forced to
adopt alternative means of mining if there are established alternative prac-
same vendor; instead they have limited the doctrine to the land actually covered by the deed
between the cotenant vendor and his vendee.").
53. Id. The court also rejected the purchasers' claims to the mineral estate by the doc-
trines of (1) ratification and acquiescence; (2) estoppel; and (3) adverse possession. Id. at 765-
68.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 765-66.
56. Id. at 767.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 766-67.
59. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
60. 854 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993).
61. Id. This action arose after a portion surface of a tract subject to an oil, gas and min-
eral lease was flooded to form a new lake. Id. at 910.




tices available.6 If there is only one means of surface use to produce the
minerals, the mineral owner has the right to pursue that use.6 5
Relying upon Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District v. Banta,66
the owners of the mineral estate argued that where a governmental entity
condemns the surface but not the mineral estate, interference with the min-
eral owner's use of the surface constitutes a taking by inverse condemnation
to which the accommodation doctrine does not apply. The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed, finding that the mineral owners have only a right to reason-
able use of the surface, and that no taking of the of the mineral estate has
occurred unless all reasonable means of access to the surface have been
restricted. 67
2. Royalty Interests
In GHR Energy Corp. v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. ,68 Trans-
American Natural Gas Corporation (TransAmerican) held the working in-
terest in certain leases, known as the "La Perla Ranch" in Zapata County,
Texas,69 by virtue of a 1975 farmout agreement with El Paso Natural Gas
Corporation (El Paso). Prior to execution of the farmout agreement, Trans-
American had agreed to assign to Medallion Oil Company a one-sixteenth
overriding royalty interest in oil and gas production from any mineral rights
that Medallion assisted TransAmerican in obtaining.70
TransAmerican filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1983. In 1987 Trans-
American and Medallion entered into a settlement agreement which recog-
nized Medallion's one-sixteenth overriding royalty interest in net revenues
from the La Perla Ranch. The settlement agreement also granted to Medal-
lion a one and one-half percent overriding royalty interest on production
from "certain interests owned by TransAmerican [as of April 23, 1987], in-
cluding the La Perla leasehold estate."'7 1 In 1990, TransAmerican and El
Paso settled disputes between them by terminating the 1975 farmout agree-
ment and all leases thereunder, and El Paso assigned all of its interest in the
mineral estate in La Perla Ranch to TransAmerican.
At issue was whether Medallion's overriding royalty interest in the La
Perla Ranch production survived the termination of the El Paso farmout
agreement and the related leasehold interests. Both Medallion and Trans-
American filed motions for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court
granted summary judgment in favor of TransAmerican. 72
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971)).
66. 453 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1970).
67. Tarrant County, 854 S.W.2d at 912.
68. 972 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied per curiam, 979 F.2d 40, cert. denied sub
nor., 113 S. Ct. 1879 (1993).
69. Pursuant to the farmout agreement, TransAmerican had the right to explore and de-
velop the La Perla Ranch field and to secure gas leases therein. Id.
70. The agreement was dated in 1974 and was between Medallion and Good Hope Refin-
eries, Inc., TransAmerican's predecessor-in-interest. Id.
71. Id. at 98.
72. The district court affirmed the holding and Medallion appealed. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit examined the documents by which Medallion's overrid-
ing royalty interests were created. 73 Stating that an overriding royalty inter-
est "is an interest which is carved out of, and constitutes a part of, the
working interest created by an oil and gas lease,"'74 and following the bank-
ruptcy court's reliance upon Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes,75 the Fifth
Circuit held that when TransAmerican and El Paso terminated the leases
and interests out of which Medallion's overriding royalty was carved, the
royalty interest was necessarily extinguished. 76
The court was unpersuaded by Medallion's argument that the 1990 settle-
ment resulted in a merger of the leasehold and the mineral fee estates that
would not operate to destroy the overriding royalties, stating: "TransAmeri-
can terminated the leasehold estate and farmout agreement and acquired the
mineral fee estate, free and clear of the leases. No leasehold remained in
existence, thus, there could be no merger."'77 Additionally, the court held
that the plain language of the settlement agreement with Medallion indi-
cated that Medallion's interest would not survive a termination of the
farmout agreement. 78
The court also rejected Medallion's argument that TransAmerican could
not surrender the leasehold interest while production continued unabated on
the La Perla Ranch.79 Relying on Fain & McGaha v. Biesel,80 the court held
that TransAmerican was free to terminate the leases and extinguish the over-
riding royalty, even though production on the La Perla Ranch properties
had not ceased,81 because the lease instrument expressly authorized Trans-
American to surrender the lease, in whole or in part, at any time.8 2
Finally, the court refused, under the terms of Medallion and TransAmeri-
can's settlement agreement, to award Medallion an overriding royalty inter-
73. Id. at 98-99 (providing fairly detailed segments of the documents at issue).
74. Id. at 99 (quoting Gruss v. Cummins, 329 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
75. 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967) (providing that unless an instrument creating the
overriding royalty interest expresses to the contrary, the interest terminates when the leasehold
estate from which it is carved terminates).
76. GHR Energy, 972 F.2d at 99-100.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 100.
80. 331 S.W.2d 346, 347-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding
that where the lease instrument authorizes release of any part of the leasehold, the leaseholder
can surrender a portion of the estate and terminate an outstanding overriding royalty interest).
81. GHR Energy, 972 F.2d at 100. On motion for rehearing, Medallion argued that the
case was controlled by Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1958, no writ). The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument holding that "[t]he facts in Cain
suggested that the [lessor and lessee] .. .intentionally harmed the overriding royalty interest
owner for their own unjustifiable benefit," when they terminated the original lease and entered
a new lease even though production had never stopped. 979 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1993).
Instead, the Fifth Circuit found that Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.
1967) was applicable because there was no " 'bad faith on the part of the lessee,' " as was true
with TransAmerican. Id. at 41. Noting that the agreement between TransAmerican and El
Paso to terminate the leases was the settlement of a genuine dispute, the Fifth Circuit suggests
that in any case involving a "hint of impropriety," the outcome may differ. Id.
82. GHR Energy, 972 F.2d at 100.
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est on the mineral fee interest acquired from El Paso.8 3 The court held that
the settlement agreement granted Medallion overriding royalty interests
only in those properties owned by TransAmerican as of April 23, 1987.84
The court further held that the extension and renewal clause in the settle-
ment agreement applied only to leases and not to fee interests.85 The court
therefore declined to alter the bargain made by the parties.86
In Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas Co. 87 the plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to an overriding
royalty interest in several oil and gas leases owned by the defendant, though
not mentioned therein, on the grounds that the defendant's leases recited
that they were in renewal and in extension of previous leases in which the
plaintiff did have such an interest. The plaintiff claimed that in the assign-
ment creating plaintiff's interest, it was specifically provided that plaintiff's
overriding royalty would continue in any renewals or extensions of the origi-
nal leases. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that defendant had proved that the
original leases had terminated for lack of production in paying quantities,
that more than a year had passed after their termination, and that, in spite of
language in the new leases to the effect that they were renewals of the previ-
ous leases, plaintiff had come forward with no evidence which would support
its claim.88 Citing Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes89 and McCormick v.
Krueger,90 the court held that there could be no renewal and extension of an
expired lease if the new lease was entered into after the prior lease's termina-
tion, if new consideration existed to support the new lease, if the new lease
was executed under different circumstances, and if the new lease contained
new terms.91 The plaintiff's case met none of the criteria.
The plaintiff also argued that a fiduciary relationship had been created
between plaintiff and defendant by the renewal and extension clause, giving
rise to a constructive trust upon the new leases in plaintiff's favor. The
court, however, held that the assignment which initially reserved the over-
ride did not in itself create a fiduciary relationship. 92 The court further held
that the plaintiff had shown no fraud or special relationship which would
otherwise create a constructive trust.93
In Carter v. Exxon Corp. 94 the issues were whether royalties on gas should





87. 843 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
88. Id. at 126.
89. 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967).
90. 593 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. Exploration Co., 843 S.W.2d at 125-26.
92. Id. at 126-27.
93. Id. (citing Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.
1966)).
94. 842 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
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or on the market value of the processed gas as it left Exxon's gas processing
plant, and whether market value was determined by interstate or intrastate
prices. The jury and trial court found for Exxon. The court of appeals
affirmed. 95
The lease contained a common provision for payment of royalties: "The
royalties to be paid by Lessee are.., on gas.., produced from said land and
sold or used off the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other prod-
uct therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or
used ... .,"96 In the field, casinghead gas from the wellhead was first sent to
a separator to remove oil and condensate. The raw gas was processed by
Exxon's Neches Gas Plant where all liquefiable hydrocarbons were removed
and sent to another Exxon facility. The residue gas was used in several ways
by Exxon, the primary use being re-injection into the field's reservoir to as-
sist in lifting oil. Another use was to fuel the Neches Gas Plant, and finally,
a small portion was sold in interstate commerce under contract to United
Gas Pipe Line Company dated 1966.
The royalty owners argued that royalty payments should be based on the
higher of either the value of the separated liquid products less the cost in-
curred in the processing or the intrastate market value of the gas used to
make the liquid products. The court's opinion is silent as to the reasoning
supporting the claim. The court, citing Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America,9 7 held that the inclusion of the words "at the well" in the royalty
provision indicated that "royalties are owed for gas that is produced in its
natural state, not on the components of the gas that are later extracted.
98
The court continued " '[a]t the well' designates the point in the gas produc-
tion process where market value is to be calculated on the gas used for the
extraction of liquid products." 99 And, "[m]arket value is to be calculated
the instant the gas is produced from the reservoir."'1°
The court similarly refused the royalty owners' claim that intrastate prices
should be used to determine market value.' 0 ' The court noted that neither
party disputed the fact that the gas sold to United was gas sold in interstate
commerce.' 0 2 The issue, however, was the price to be calculated on gas
"used," not sold. Finding no difference, the court held that "[s]ince the gas
used to make liquid products was natural gas which, if sold, would be re-
quired to be sold in interstate commerce, this gas was subject to the maxi-
mum lawful price scheme ....
95. Id. at 400.
96. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
97. 789 F.2d 1151, (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 793 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
98. Carter, 842 S.W.2d at 397.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 397-98.
102. Id.




In Evans v. Gulf Oil Corp. 104 the mineral interest owners sued Gulf Oil
and others owning working interests and overriding royalties. The owners
sought a declaratory judgment that their oil and gas leases had terminated
due to failure of production in paying quantities. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the defendants had established as a matter of law that an essen-
tial element of the plaintiffs' case did not exist.'0 5
Each lease continued in effect "for so long ... as oil, gas or other mineral
is produced from said land ... or drilling or reworking operations are con-
ducted thereon." The court noted that the term "produced" meant "pro-
duced in paying quantities,"'' 0 6 and that in order to prove a failure of same,
the plaintiffs were required to show that (1) the production failed to yield a
profit after deducting operating and marketing costs, and (2) a prudent oper-
ator, operating for profit and not speculation, would not have continued to
operate the well as it had been operated, even if marginally profitable.' 0 7
As to the first element, the plaintiffs claimed that any computation of
profit had to reflect that the defendants had owed them a higher price for
their royalty gas than was paid. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that depreci-
ation of a compressor used on the wells should have been considered in de-
termining profitability. If both were considered part of the operating and
marketing costs, the wells were unprofitable.
Although the court stated that the issue of "paying quantities" was usu-
ally one of fact, it held that what might have been paid for royalty gas was
irrelevant, in that it was not an actual expenditure at the relevant times and
in any event, would also have increased the amounts of revenue to the work-
ing interest proportionately.10 8 The court further held that while actual de-
preciation could be added to "lifting expenses" as an operating cost, the
plaintiffs in this case had done nothing more than compute depreciation as
an accounting expense without regard to actual cost.' 09 The court then con-
cluded that while there may have been actual depreciation of this equipment
which could have been a legitimate operating expense, it could be mathemat-
ically shown that its actual cost for the periods in question would not render
the wells unprofitable. 10
The defendants' proof being undisputed that revenues would exceed oper-
ating and marketing expenses for the periods in question, absent the charges
104. 840 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
105. Id. at 502.
106. Id. (citing Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (1942); Bales v. Delhi-
Taylor Oil Corp., 362 S.W.2d 388, 390-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Fick v. Wilson, 349 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, writ refd
n.r.e.)).
107. Id. at 503 (citing the case of Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691
(1959)).
108. Id. at 504.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 505.
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for increased royalty and depreciation, the court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to raise a fact question as to whether the wells were unprofitable."'
The court therefore affirmed the trial court judgment. 1 2 The question of
whether a reasonably prudent operator would have continued operations
was not reached.11 3
In Exploracion de la Estrella Soloataria Incorporacion v. Birdwel 1 14 the
Eastland Court of Appeals held that the execution of a division order pro-
vided by a crude oil purchaser would not save leases that had terminated for
lack of production in paying quantities under the doctrine of notification or
revival.1 1 5 The court stated that "[t]he doctrine of revival or notification
holds that the subsequent execution of a formal document which expressly
recognizes in clear language the validity of a lifeless lease revives the
lease." 1 6 The division orders, which were executed to recover monies held
in suspense by the purchaser for production occurring prior to the termina-
tion of the leases, did not contain any language granting an estate in land or
that would effect a revival of the lease." 7 In addition, the court recognized
that at least one case' 18 has suggested that in the absence of an express grant,
the mere execution of a division order will revive an oil and gas lease only if
there has been detrimental reliance on the part of the lessee.' 1 9 Without
deciding whether detrimental reliance is an element of the doctrine, the
court noted that detrimental reliance had not been shown in this case.1 20
Finally, the court held that the doctrine of repudiation, by which a lessee
is relieved from any obligation to conduct any operation on the land to
maintain the lease in force while a judicial resolution of the controversy be-
tween the lessee and lessor over the validity of the lease is pending, ' 2' would
not excuse the lack of operations by the lessees. 122 The court noted that the
leases had terminated by their own terms prior to the time that the lessors
could have repudiated the leases.' 23 The court therefore held that for the
doctrine of repudiation to apply, the lease must be subsisting.' 24
In Ice Brothers, Inc. v. Bannowsky 125 the plaintiff took an oil and gas lease
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Peacock v. Schroeder, 846 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ)
(addressing lease termination and production in paying quantities issues closely aligned with
those issues in Evans).
114. 858 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, no writ).
115. Id. at 554.
116. Id. (citing Westbrook v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 502 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1973); Loeffler
v. King, 149 Tex. 626, 236 S.W.2d 772 (1951); McVey v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
117. Id.
118. Bradley v. Avery, 746 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
119. Exploracion de la Estrella, 858 S.W.2d at 554.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 56, 308 S.W.2d 1 (1957); Cheyenne Re-
sources, Inc. v. Criswell, 714 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ)).
122. Id. at 554-55.
123. Id. at 555.
124. Id.
125. 840 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
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subject to a prior, unreleased lease owned by the defendant covering land in
Runnels County. The plaintiff then filed suit for a declaratory judgment that
the prior lease had terminated for lack of production. As stated by the
court, the lease terms in question were, in part, as follows:
The ... Lease was for a primary term of three years commencing from
its date and was to continue "as long thereafter as operations, as herein-
after defined, are conducted upon said land with no cessation for more
than ninety (90) consecutive days." [O]perations was defined ...as
production of ... gas ... whether or not in paying quantities. 26
The primary issue for the jury was whether production of gas had ceased
for a period of more than ninety continuous days. The trial court properly
instructed the jury that the term "production" means "actually taking gas
from a well in a captive state and either placing the same in storage or mar-
keting it." '1 2 7 The defendant presented several witnesses who each testified
that on numerous occasions never more than sixty days apart, he had either
heard or felt gas rushing through the lines at the wellhead, but that he had
not followed the flow lines to see where the gas was going. The plaintiffs'
witnesses all testified that there had been no sales for the period, no meters
on the wellhead, no production, and no reports of production filed with the
Texas Railroad Commission. The pipeline purchaser testified that it had
permanently removed its meters more than a year prior to the date of filing
suit.
The jury and trial court refused to find that production had ceased for a
period of more than ninety continuous days. The court of appeals reversed
and rendered for the plaintiff, holding that plaintiff had been entitled to a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 28 The basis for the court's ruling
was that evidence that gas may have been flowing was no evidence that it
was being taken in a "captive state" (except illegally, perhaps) or that it was
being stored or marketed.' 29 The court reasoned that to infer that gas was
being taken in a captive state and that it was being sold or stored would be to
impermissibly base an inference upon an inference.' 30
In Gray v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. 131 the Grays, mineral owners and
lessors, sued the record leasehold owners for trespass and breach of contract,
alleging that the lease under which the defendants claimed had terminated
for lack of production at the end of its primary term.' 3 2 The defendants
alleged, and the trial court by final summary judgment agreed, that the lease
had been perpetuated by the commencement of actual operations before the
end of the primary term, and that no trespass could have occurred.
It was undisputed that actual operations had commenced before the expi-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 59.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 61.
130. Id. (citing Rounsaville v. Bullard, 154 Tex. 260, 276 S.W.2d 791, 794 (1955)).
131. 834 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
132. The breach of contract claim is not discussed in this Article. The facts surrounding
the claim are not clear from the court's opinion, and the court's ruling upon the claim does not
change the result of the opinion holding or the described.
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ration of the primary term which were otherwise sufficient to perpetuate the
lease under its "commencement of operations" clause.133 It was also undis-
puted that Texas Railroad Commission rule 3.5(a)(1) 134 provided that
"[o]perations of DRILLING... shall not be commenced until... (a) PER-
MIT has been granted by the commission and the waiting period, if any, has
terminated... ""35 The issue before the court was whether the Commission
rule would be implied as a part of the lease so that prior receipt of a permit
from the Commission was necessary to make actual operations effective to
perpetuate the lease.
Noting that it was an issue of first impression in Texas and rejecting con-
trary precedent in Michigan,' 36 the court held that "[t]he Commission's
function is to administer the conservation laws and, when in doing so by
granting a permit to drill a well, it does not undertake to adjudicate property
rights."1 37 The court concluded that "[O]btaining the drilling permit was
not a prerequisite to the preliminary drilling operations which, the parties
agreed, otherwise perpetuated the Grays' lease beyond its primary term.' 38
Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc. 139 is the third opinion which has been
written in this dispute.14° The facts in the case are relatively simple, but the
proper legal result to flow therefrom may nevertheless be difficult. The case
involves an oil and gas lease dated May 31, 1937, from Dean to Wiggins
covering 7,893 acres (base lease), which provided for a primary term of ten
years and "as long thereafter as oil and gas ... is produced ... ." The lease
also provided that after expiration of the primary term, and upon cessation
of production, the lessee would have sixty days within which to commence
operations. The lease was assignable by the lessee in whole or in part.
Production was soon achieved on the lease, which has continued and kept
the entire lease alive through all times material to this case. Subsequently,
Superior Oil Company acquired the base lease and on June 1, 1949, assigned
a leasehold interest in 329.3 acres upon which there was no production to
Western and others (Western). The assignment in paragraph 1, among other
things, required Western to drill a well within thirty days at a location which
would satisfy any then existing offset obligation, and failing to so drill would
cause the assignment to "cease and terminate and ... revert to and revest in
133. Paragraph 9 of the lease provided in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision, if lessee commences mining, drilling or
reworking operations on said land or on a consolidated leasehold estate at any
time while this lease is in force, this lease shall remain in force as provided by
any provision hereof and for any longer time during which said operations, or
any additional operations, are prosecuted with no cessation of more than sixty
consecutive days.
Id. at 580.
134. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5(a)(1) (Vernon Sept. 1, 1988).
135. Id. at 580.
136. Goble v. Goff, 42 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1950).
137. Gray, 834 S.W.2d at 582.
138. Id.
139. 852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ granted).




Superior .... ,"141 In addition, the assignment provided as follows:
2.
Western shall and hereby does assume and agree to perform and dis-
charge all of the [base] lease obligations .... To this end, it is recognized
by the parties hereto... that there now are a number of ... off-set wells
which Western shall protect against by the drilling of properly located
wells on the ... land. 14 2
5.
In the event that the production of oil, gas... is developed.., and
Western desires to abandon or cease operating the same, Western shall
notify Superior... and Superior may, at its election, require Western to
transfer and assign to Superior ... all of Western's right . . . to said
lease ....
7.
Upon the termination of the rights of Western hereunder and/or with
respect to the above described lease, as herein and in said lease expressly
provided, or otherwise, Western shall deliver to Superior upon demand,
a good and sufficient quit-claim deed and release. Any delay ...of
Western to deliver any such quit-claim and release shall in no way pre-
vent such rights from terminating, and reverting to and revesting in
Superior as herein expressly provided and contemplated. 143
Western immediately drilled and completed a well which was marginally
productive and ceased production in July 1961. Approximately one year
before the well ceased production, on August 23, 1960, the then-president of
Western, acting in his individual capacity only, assigned the lease to the
329.3 acres to the Dakota Company, a company in which Campbell was an
officer and stockholder, in return for a promissory note and deed of trust.
The assignment referred to a previous assignment from Western to Camp-
bell, but neither the instrument nor evidence sufficient as a substitute was
introduced. Through a series of conveyances thereafter, Ricane Enterprises,
et al. (Ricane) ended up with an assignment of the lease, and in October
1979, drilled a successful well.
The plaintiffs, stockholders and other successors to the assets of Western
whose charter was forfeited in 1965, filed suit in 1984 against Ricane in tres-
pass to try title for possession of the land. According to the court, "[a]ll
parties have agreed that Western is the common source of title to the subject
property.' 44 It was undisputed that Western conducted no operations of
any kind after 1961. Apparently and remarkably, neither Superior nor its
successor was a party to the litigation and at no time has it sought to enforce
its rights under the base lease.
The trial was to a jury which answered eighteen different issues. Among
141. Rogers, 852 S.W.2d at 754.
142. The Supreme Court of Texas had previously held that this clause imposed a covenant,
not a condition which would by its terms, terminate the assignment. Rogers, 772 S.W.2d at 79.
143. Rogers, 852 S.W.2d at 754-55.
144. Id. at 755.
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them were findings that Western "abandoned or ceased operating" the prem-
ises;1 45 that Western "abandoned the purposes" of the assignment; 146 that
Western had been the owner of all or part of the property since 1960; and
that it had owned a one-third working interest. The court did not mention
any other finding in its opinion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment holding for the defendants.' 47
The basis for the court's judgment was that in a trespass to try title suit,
the plaintiff was required to recover on the strength of its own title, not on
the weakness of its opponent's title.' 48 The court held that the plaintiff
could not do so in light of its nonperformance of the terms of the assignment
as found by the jury. 14 9 Having found that the plaintiffs could not prove
their title, the court applied the "well established rule" that the effect of a
take-nothing judgment in a trespass case vests title in the defendant and
awarded title to the defendants.15 0
There are various weaknesses in the opinion, but perhaps the most glaring
is a lack of standing in the defendants to assert the breach of a contract, i.e.,
the assignment, to which they are not a party. The effect is to allow a mere
trespasser, albeit in good faith, perhaps, to retain possession of realty as
against the true record owner thereof due to the latter's failure to prove
performance of all covenants in his chain of title.
C. ISSUES INVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
1. Railroad Commission's Authority to Regulate
R.D. Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas '5 was an appeal by an oil
operator from a district court decision upholding an order of the Commis-
sion ordering that eight oil wells operated by R.D. Oil be plugged for failure
to properly cement the wells to prevent pollution as required by the Com-
mission's "Statewide Rule 13."152 The questions before the court were
whether the Commission's order was supported by "substantial evidence,"
whether actual pollution, not potential, was required to be shown before an
order to plug could issue, and whether the Commission's decision was a tak-
ing without due process. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment upholding the Commission's order.153
The primary burden of the operator was to demonstrate that there was not
substantial evidence in the record that the cementing job was a potential
pollution hazard.154 Expert witnesses for R.D. Oil and the landowner, who
145. Id. at 759.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 764.
148. Id. at 762-64.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 849 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
152. See Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13 (Vernon 1988) ("Statewide
Rule 13").
153. R.D. Oil Co., 849 S.W.2d at 871.
154. Id. at 872. See Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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was the original complainant in the Commission, were heard on the subject.
The landowner's experts testified that they had taken samples of cement
from near the surface that was defective and that they could indicate defects
in the lower zones, because if the cement had been properly pumped into the
well, the cement would have been homogenous and uniform throughout.
R.D. Oil's experts testified that the surface samples of cement were not
representative of cement quality in the "critical zone" of the wells and that
cement quality improves with depth and age. They also tested cement sam-
ples taken from the "critical zone," but testified that due to the small size of
the samples, it was impossible to conduct all of the testing necessary to show
compliance with Rule 13. Based upon that testimony and the fact that the
Commission had made an uncontested fact finding that R.D. Oil had used
the proper method of pumping cement into the well, R.D. Oil argued that
the evidence presented by the landowner did not constitute sufficient evi-
dence to uphold the Commission's order. The court held, however, that
"reasonable minds could have reached the decision the Commission made,"
and "[a]ccordingly, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the rec-
ord to support the Commission's conclusion that the wells were not properly
cemented to prevent pollution."' 155
On the question of whether proof of actual pollution was required before
the plugging order could issue, R.D. Oil argued that Sections 89.001 and
89.041 of the Natural Resources Code1 56 controlled and required a finding
of actual pollution. The court, however, held that the Commission had re-
lied instead on Section 91.101 of the Code which specifically provided for
orders to plug wells to prevent pollution, and that that could apply to poten-
tial pollution as well as actual pollution.1 57 The court further found that
there had been no taking without due process since there was substantial
evidence of potential pollution, the prevention of which was a valid exercise
of the police power. 15 8
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Lone Star Gas Co. 159 Lone Star Gas
Company (Lone Star) and Enserch Gas Company (Enserch) 160 sued the
Railroad Commission and the Attorney General of Texas seeking to declare
Commission Rules 30(a)(1) and (5) and 34(h)(2-4) invalid on five separate
grounds, three of which related to the Commission's statutory authority, i.e.,
the Texas Natural Resources Code, one of which complained that the rules
disregarded the separate corporate existence of Lone Star and Enserch with-
out notice, hearing or evidence, and the last that the Rules were preempted
by federal law. The trial court dismissed Lone Star's case on other grounds,
but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment on the ground that
the Rules were preempted by federal law. 16 1 The Texas Supreme Court re-
155. Id.
156. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 89.001-.041 (Vernon 1978).
157. Rogers, 852 S.W.2d at 874.
158. Id.
159. 844 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1992).
160. Lone Star was a division of Enserch, a subsidiary of Enserch Corporation. Id. at 682.
161. Id.
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versed and rendered.1 62
The targeted rules were adopted by the Commission in 1987 in response to
the pipeline companies' creation of "special marketing programs," generally
known as SMPs. The SMPs evolved as the pipeline industry's answer to its
over-purchase of natural gas. The SMPs, in this case, Enserch Gas Com-
pany, were separate corporate entities created by the pipeline companies for
the purpose of selling cheaper spot market gas to the pipeline company's
customers who would not purchase from the pipeline company at the higher
price. Rather than selling gas for which it had a long-term, higher-priced
obligation at a lower price, and suffer a loss, the pipeline company would
have the SMP buy gas on the spot market, or from the pipeline company's
long term, higher-priced supplies, at a lower price. Concerned in part with
the latter transaction, and with the leverage which the pipelines could bring
to bear on their producers, particularly captive producers where no other
line was available, and additionally with bringing the SMPs within the prior-
ity system concerning nominations, the Commission adopted the rules in-
volved in this litigation. Among other things, the rules allowed a properly
created and operating SMP to be treated as a separate first purchaser, even
though it used the identical pipeline system. In so doing the rules recognized
the existence of a separate and distinct gas market, i.e., the short term or
spot market which is highly price-sensitive.
The rules then attempted to prevent the misuse of the SMPs. The SMPs
were required to offer to purchase gas without discrimination within a field
and without unjust or unreasonable discrimination between fields to all pro-
ducers for all wells on the pipeline system of the affiliated pipeline. The
SMPs were also prohibited from making their offers to purchase contingent
upon a release by the producer of the pipeline company's take-or-pay or
other obligation, except that the SMP could require that its future takes of
gas be released from the pipeline contract and that its pipeline be given a
volume credit against the pipeline's quantity obligation during the period of
SMP purchases. The rules in general were also intended to prevent waste,
promote conservation, protect correlative rights, and protect the priority
system concerning nominations, purchases, and production of gas.
The court of appeals opinion 163 contains a more extensive description of
some of Lone Star's and Enserch's arguments. The opinion makes clear that
Lone Star's primary purpose in the case was to eliminate any State controls
on gas purchasers which might have an effect on the cost and resale price of
gas, including those imposing ratability requirements and the priority system
of purchases. Lone Star was successful in obtaining a ruling that even
though those rules were within the Commission's statutory authority and
tended to prevent waste, promote conservation, and protect correlative
rights, they were nevertheless contrary to the federal policy of promoting
162. Id. at 696.
163. Lone Star Gas Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tx., 798 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. App.-Austin
1990), rev'd, 844 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1992).
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lower natural gas prices.164
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the statutory authority contained
sufficient guidelines, that the rules were within the Commission's statutory
authority and consistent with that authority, overruling Lone Star's argu-
ment that questions concerning waste and discrimination were required to be
determined on a case-by-case basis in a contested hearing after notice. 65
Citing State Board of Insurance v. Deffebach 166 for the proposition that
" 'the process of rulemaking should be utilized except in those cases ...
[when] there is a danger that its use would frustrate the effective accomplish-
ment of the agency's functions .... 1 67 the court held that "the Commis-
sion is not required to determine questions concerning waste and
discrimination by a contested case proceeding."' 168
The court also held that the rules did not disregard the separate corporate
existence of Enserch and Lone Star. 16 9 Recognizing that it was dealing with
one pipeline system only, the court noted that the rules applied only to the
situation where both companies used the same pipeline and refused to qual-
ify as separate "first purchasers."' 170
Finally, the court reversed the lower court on the question of federal pre-
emption, concluding that "Congress has not comprehensively legislated
through the NGA or the NGPA to occupy the entire field of intrastate natu-
ral gas regulation."' 7' Having concluded that Congress did not intend to
preempt all state regulation of the natural gas industry, the court then stated
the issue to be whether there was a conflict between the Commission rules
and the federal law regulating a pipeline purchaser's price structures and
purchasing patterns. 172 Citing Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Cor-
poration Commission 173 the court noted that there were two forms of conflict
preemption, one being impossibility of compliance with both state and fed-
eral law, and the other being where the state rules "[stood] as an obstacle to
congressional objectives regarding its natural gas policies.' 74 Lone Star did
not complain that it would be impossible to comply with both state and
federal regulations, only that the state rules were an obstacle to congres-
sional objectives.
The court first concluded that "the mere fact that state regulation impacts
gas prices is insufficient to conclude that the Rules are preempted.' 75 And
further, "[a]lthough the Rules may have an incremental effect on natural gas
prices, an incremental effect on price alone is an insufficient basis to preempt
164. Id. at 893.
165. Lone Star Gas, 844 S.W.2d at 688.
166. 631 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
167. Lone Star Gas, 844 S.W.2d at 689.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 689-90.
170. Id. at 690.
171. Id. at 694.
172. Id.
173. 489 U.S. 493 (1989).
174. Lone Star Gas, 844 S.W.2d at 694.
175. Id. at 695 (citing Northwest Central Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 514).
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the Rules .... Furthermore, the supreme court does not require the lowest
price. Only fair prices are required." 176
Having thus found that the rules might permissibly have an "incremental"
effect on gas prices without running afoul of federal policies, the court ex-
amined whether the rules could "plausibly be related to matters of legitimate
state concern .... ",177 The court stated the issue as follows:
More specifically, whether the Rules primarily regulate (1) rates of gas
production or gas producers which fall within the State's traditional
authority to regulate rates of production, conserve resources and pro-
tect correlative rights or (2) purchasing patterns of interstate pipelines
of purchasers of gas for resale after transportation in interstate com-
merce which fall within the federal regulatory authority over transpor-
tation and rates.' 78
The court analyzed the purposes for the rules, which included (1) mini-
mizing monopolistic abuses which occurred when SMPs purchased gas from
producers on their affiliate's pipeline system; 17 9 (2) preventing discrimina-
tion and monopolistic abuses by common purchasers; 80 and (3) preventing
waste.' 8' The court found that those purposes were legitimate and tradi-
tional state concerns, that the rules were "plausibly related" to those con-
cerns, and held that "(c)onsequently ... we conclude that the Rules are not
preempted by federal law."' 182
2. Appealing Railroad Commission Orders
The case of EnRE Corp. v. Railroad Commission of Texas 183 was an ap-
peal from a district court judgment dismissing a suit for judicial review of a
Railroad Commission order to an operator to plug four oil wells. The issue
on appeal was whether a provision of the Texas Natural Resources Code 184
which required either the payment of a civil penalty or a bond in lieu thereof
as a prerequisite to judicial review was unconstitutional as violative of the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. 85 Holding the provision
unconstitutional, the court reversed and remanded the cause for judicial
review. 18 6
The Commission's final order to plug the four wells also required the pay-
ment of an administrative penalty of $8000. The operator timely complied
with all the prerequisites for judicial review except the requirement that the
penalty be paid or a bond be posted to secure its payment. Citing a recent
176. Id. (citing Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board, 474 U.S.
409 (1986)).
177. Id. at 694 (citing Northwest Central Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 528).
178. Id. at 696.
179. Id. at 694.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 696.
182. Id.
183. 852 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
184. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0533(b) (Vernon 1978).
185. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
186. EnRe Corp., 852 S.W.2d at 665.
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Texas Supreme Court case, 187 the court held as follows:
Although the state may legitimately require a party to prepay the pen-
alty or post bond if the party wishes to stay execution of the order dur-
ing appeal, conditioning judicial review on such requirements does not
comport with the open records provision... Accordingly, we declare
section 81.0533(b) of the Code unconstitutional insofar as it requires a
supersedeas bond or cash deposit as a prerequisite to judicial review.
We further declare section 81.0533(d) of the Code, the forfeiture provi-
sion, unconstitutional. 188
The case of Jolly v. State 189 also involved an order by the Railroad Com-
mission to an operator to plug several inactive oil wells. The Commission's
final order, entered December 18, 1989, was ignored by the operator for ap-
proximately two years, until this case was filed to enforce the Commission's
orders.
The operator did not appear at the Commission hearing in which the final
order was entered, did not file a motion for rehearing, and failed to bring suit
for judicial review in district court. The Commission's order, therefore, be-
came final. 190
The trial court, after two separate hearings in which the operator was
enjoined to plug the wells or suffer large civil penalties, finally entered a final
judgment that ordered the operator to plug the wells within forty-five days,
assessed a penalty of $75,000, and awarded attorney's fees. 19 1 The operator
appealed, complaining that he was not the operator, that the Commission
failed to allow him to bring witnesses to the hearing, that the Commission
failed to consider "evidence" he submitted by mail, failed to review its own
records, misled him about the nature of the hearing, and failed to join as
parties the culpable operators of the wells.192
Finding that each of these complaints was, in fact, a collateral attack on
the Commission's order, the court held that "the Commission's order was
now final and unappealable."' 193 The court continued that "[a] final order of
the Commission that is valid on its face is not subject to collateral attack in a
subsequent enforcement proceeding."' 194
3. General Land Office Audits
In State v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co. 195 the Supreme Court of Texas consoli-
187. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993).
188. EnRE Corp., 852 S.W.2d at 664.
189. 856 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
190. Id. at 860.
191. In the final hearing before the Commission, a $6000 penalty had been imposed by the
Commission. That penalty was increased to $36,000 in the first hearing before the district
court.
192. The operator also argued that he failed to receive notice of the Commission, but failed
to raise the objection until his motion for rehearing in the district court. The court held that
the point had not been preserved for review.
193. Id. at 861.
194. Id. (citing Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961, 967 (Tex. 1945), and
other authorities.)
195. 852 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1993).
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dated two cases involving the authority of the General Land Office196 (GLO)
to determine contract rights under state mineral leases and the constitution-
ality of the requirement that lessees under state mineral leases prepay dis-
puted assessments of deficient royalties to the state before filing an action to
contest the assessment.
The four respondents, Flag-Redfern Oil Co., Rutherford Oil Corporation,
Conoco Inc., and Ladd Petroleum Corporation,1 97 Lessees under state min-
eral leases, were the subjects of audits by the GLO which resulted in assess-
ments of deficiencies in royalty payments owing to the State of Texas. The
assessments were based, in large part, on the GLO's determination that the
subject leases were not "market value" leases and that royalties could not be
based on gross proceeds. Initially, the Lessees requested hearings to contest
the deficiencies, but before the hearings were concluded, filed lawsuits chal-
lenging the authority of the GLO to make legal determinations in the course
of audits. In one action, the GLO was enjoined from proceeding with a
hearing,198 and both trial courts granted summary judgments for the Les-
sees, holding that the GLO cannot determine controverted property rights
and that an "audit," as defined by statute, 99 was limited to an examination
for accounting-type errors resulting in royalty deficiencies. 2°°
The Texas Supreme Court held that neither the express wording of Sec-
tion 52.135 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, nor the legislative history
and purpose of the statute, supported the lower courts' holdings that GLO
audits are confined to searches for accounting-type errors in royalty pay-
ments °.20  The court rejected Lessees' constitutional argument that the
broader interpretation of audit would improperly empower the GLO to de-
termine controverted property rights.202 The court reasoned that because
the State of Texas, as a lessor, is a party to the disputed leases, a hearing
under Section 52.135 is "no different, in principle, from routine decision-
making by any ordinary lessor," and is an not attempt by the state to adjudi-
cate the relative rights of private parties.20 3 The holding was limited, how-
196. The General Land Office (GLO) is an executive agency charged with maintaining
state-owned properties, including audits of the books and records of oil and gas leases covering
state lands.
197. Hereinafter referred to as "Lessees."
198. Id. at 482. See Rutherford Oil Corp. v. General Land Office, 776 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
199. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.135 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
200. General Land Office v. Rutherford Oil Corp., 802 S.W.2d 65, 68-9 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1990), afl'd, State v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1993); General Land
Office v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), afl'd, State v. Flag-
Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1993).
201. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d at 483.
202. Id. at 484. The Lessees' argument was based upon the Texas Constitution, article II,
section 1, which provides, in part, that none of the three departments of state government shall
exercise any power properly attached to another department, citing Board of Water Engineers
v. McKnight, I l1 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301 (1921), for the rule that only the judicial department
may determine controverted property rights by binding judgments.
203. Id. at 484 (distinguishing Board of Water Eng'rs v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W.
301 (1921); R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. City of Austin, 524 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1975); and Magno-
lia Petroleum Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 141 Tex. 96, 170 S.W.2d 189 (1943)).
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ever, as follows: "To the extent that section 52.135 merely allows the State
to reassess its position with regard to state mineral leases, rather than to
subject participants to binding judgments, we hold that the statute does not
offend ... the Texas Constitution. ' '20 4
The Texas Supreme Court then found that hearings under Section 52.135
of the Texas Natural Resources Code do in fact result in binding judgments,
and are therefore unconstitutional, because judicial review is unavailable un-
less a lessee pre-pays the disputed assessment amount in full. 20 5 The court
also concluded that the prepayment provision violates Article I, Section 13
of the Texas Constitution, as an unreasonable interference with access to the
courts.
2 0 6
Consequently, although the GLO cannot make a binding determination of
controverted property rights, it may conduct full scale audits which include
factual and legal determinations and hold hearings for the redetermination
of deficiency assessments. 20 7 Section 52.137 of the Texas Natural Resources
Code still governs the manner in which a lessee may challenge the GLO's
determinations, 20 8 but a lessee may bring suit as provided in the statute,
without prepayment of the assessment. 20 9
D. JOINT OPERATIONS
1. Construction of Joint Operating Agreements
Stine v. Marathon Oil Co. 210 involves, primarily, the meaning of an excul-
patory clause in a joint operating agreement (JOA) 2 11 between Stine and
Marathon, covering wells operated by Marathon. Both Stine and Marathon
acquired their leasehold interests through a farmout agreement from In-
terNorth, Inc. After suit was filed by Marathon against Stine for unpaid
drilling and operating expenses, Stine counterclaimed alleging that Mara-
thon tortiously interfered with his contract for the sale of his portion of gas
produced to Cibolo Gas, Inc. and breached duties owed to him under the
JOA in connection with testing and completion of wells. Stine also alleged
that Marathon failed to drill exploratory wells, resulting in abandonment of
lease acreage, and that under the JOA he was entitled to an assignment of
that acreage. Marathon ultimately collected its operating and drilling ex-
penses and the trial court realigned the parties. The district court subse-
204. Id. at 484.
205. Id.; see TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.137(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
206. Id. at 485 (citing LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (1986); Texas Assoc. of Bus. v.




209. Id. Note, however, a concurring opinion by Justice Gonzales, agreeing that the Texas
Natural Resources Code section 52.137 violates the open courts provision of the Texas Consti-
tution, but arguing that a GLO audit should be limited to the plain meaning of the term, which
does not include a legal inquiry, and that the audit described by the majority does allow the
GLO to adjudicate controverted property rights. Id. at 487-88.
210. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law).
211. Hereinafter, the "JOA."
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quently entered summary judgment for Marathon on Stine's claim that he
was entitled to an assignment of acreage abandoned by Marathon. The re-
maining claims were tried to a jury which, in large part, found in favor of
Stine.212 Stine appealed the lower court's ruling on summary judgment and
Marathon appealed the judgment entered on the jury findings.
Marathon contended that the exculpatory clause in the JOA 213 protected
it from all of Stine's claims made under the JOA, unless its actions were
grossly negligent or willful. The Fifth Circuit first found the exculpatory
clause to be clear and unambiguous, and held that it protected Marathon for
good faith performance of duties under the JOA, but did not protect it from
liability for acts outside the scope of its powers under the agreement. 214 Be-
cause the lower court had not properly instructed the jury with respect to
the exculpatory clause, the judgment in favor of Stine for breach of the JOA
in connection with operation of the wells was reversed and remanded for
new trial. 215
The court also reversed and rendered 216 the judgment against Marathon
for tortious interference with contract, acknowledging that "the assertion of
rights under, or breach of, one contract may also at the same time be a
tortious interference with 'a third party's contract if it is done with a purpose
and effect of preventing the third party from performing its contract with
another'. '217 While noting that the jury's finding of malice in connection
212. The jury found that Marathon breached its contract with Stine by not delivering oper-
ation of two wells to Stine before plugging and abandoning them; by not furnishing informa-
tion as required; by failure to complete wells in potential oil sands; and by allowing water
intrusion in certain wells through gross negligence or willful misconduct. Additionally, the
jury found tortious interference with Stine's contract with Cibolo and that the interference was
committed with actual malice.
213. The exculpatory clause states:
A. Designation and Responsibilities of Operator: [Marathon] shall be the Op-
erator of the Contract Area, and shall conduct and direct and have full control
of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by, and within
the limits of, this agreement. It shall conduct all such operations in a good and
workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other par-
ties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except as may result from gross
negligence of willful misconduct.
Stine, 976 F.2d at 259.
214. Id. at 260-61 (citing Caddo Oil Co. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir. 1990); Grace-
Cajun Oil Co. No. Two v. Damson Oil Corp., 897 F.2d 1364, 1366 (5th Cir. 1990); Spiritas v.
Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court
stated:
It is clear to us that the protection of the exculpatory clause extends not only to
"acts unique to the operator," as the district court expressed it, but also to any
acts done under the authority of the JOA "as Operator." This protection clearly
extends to breaches of the JOA. It also reaches other acts including acts per-
formed "as Operator" under the authority of the JOA that amount to tortious
interference with contracts with third parties. We, therefore, hold that the ex-
culpatory clause protects Marathon from liability for any act taken in its capac-
ity "as Operator" under the JOA (except for gross negligence or willful
misconduct).
Id.
215. Id. at 267.
216. Id. at 264.
217. Id. at 262 (quoting American Nat'l Petroleum Corp. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 798 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. 1990)).
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with Stine's tortious interference with contract claim would negate the pro-
tection of the exculpatory clause, the court held that Stine had not adduced
any evidence of damage as a result of any tortious act of Marathon. 218
Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
that Marathon had not violated the JOA by failing to assign acreage to Stine
in lieu of surrendering that acreage, as required by the JOA.219 The court
held that, to survive the summary judgment motion, Stine had to present
some evidence that Marathon intended to surrender any lease or portion of a
lease without offering to assign the acreage to Stine.220 Finding that Stine
failed to adduce such evidence, the court affirmed that both parties had an
obligation under the JOA to preserve the leases by drilling wells or paying
delay rentals,22' and that a statement by Marathon that it did not intend to
drill new wells, made as it attempted to negotiate a sale of its leasehold inter-
ests to a third party, is not evidence of an intent to surrender a leasehold
interest. 222
Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc. 223 involved the claims of non-
operating working interest owners in a number of drilling ventures against
the operator of the wells. Each well invested in by a non-operator was sub-
ject to a June 1981 joint operating agreement 224 and a letter agreement spe-
cific to the investment, governing the drilling, completion, production and
operation of each well. The JOA attached an Exhibit "C," setting forth ac-
counting procedures standard to the oil and gas industry, which provided
that the investors may pay charges to the operator without prejudice to their
right to later contest their validity. The JOA also provided that "all bills
and statements issued in the course of a calendar year are 'conclusively...
presumed to be true and correct' twenty-four months after the end of the
calendar year in which they were rendered unless, within those twenty-four
months, the non-operator . . . 'takes written exception thereto and makes
claim on Operator... for adjustment'. '225 In addition, the JOA allowed the
218. Id. at 263-64. The only damage claimed by Stine was his decision to terminate his gas
contract with Cibilo. The court found that the one tortious act committed by Marathon oc-
curred after Stine had terminated the contract and so could not, as a matter of law, have
caused the damage alleged. Id. at 264.
219. Id. at 266. Article VIII.A of the JOA provided:
The leases covered by this agreement, insofar as they embrace acreage in the
Contract Area, shall not be surrendered in whole or in part unless all parties
consent thereto.
However, should any party desire to surrender its interest in any lease or in
any portion thereof, and other parties do not agree or consent thereto, the party
desiring to surrender shall assign, without express or implied warranty of title,
all of its interest is [sic] such lease or portion thereof . . . to the parties not
desiring to surrender it.
Id. at 265.
220. Id. at 265.
221. Id. at 266 (citing Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed By An Operator to
Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-30, 12-
49 (1986)).
222. Id. at 266.
223. 989 F.2d 1408 (5th Cir. 1993).
224. Hereinafter the "JOA."
225. Id. at 1410.
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investors to audit the accounts and records of the operator, within the
twenty-four month adjustment period, but an audit would not extend the
time for filing written exceptions and demands for adjustment.
By early 1985, one or more investors began to question representations
made by the operator between 1981 and 1984, and began to question some of
the charges. Documentation was requested and extensive communications
with the operator continued for almost two years, with the investors con-
tending there were overcharges by the operator and the operator contending
that the investors had not paid all amounts due.
After settlement attempts were unsuccessful, the operator filed suit sepk-
ing a declaration that the charges questioned by the investors were conclu-
sively presumed correct under the two-year limitations period found in the
JOA. The operator filed several motions for summary judgment, asserting
various grounds, including that the investors claims were barred by either
the contractual limitations period or the four year statute of limitations for
breach of contract. The investors responded, in part, that the JOA account-
ing procedures did not apply to costs incurred before a well reached contract
depth; that both limitation periods were tolled by the fraudulent conceal-
ment of overcharges by the operator; and that the operator had waived, or
was estopped from asserting, the twenty-four-month limitation.
The Fifth Circuit held that the JOA and the letter agreements, having
been "executed at the same time, with the same purpose and in the course of
the same transaction" were to be construed together and were not ambigu-
ous. 2 2 6 The court agreed with the ruling of the trial court that the account-
ing procedures, including the twenty-four limitation period, applied to the
entire project, including drilling, rejecting the argument that because most of
the drilling costs were turnkeyed 227 or were covered by the letter agree-
ments, there was no need for a JOA accounting procedure in the drilling
stage. 228 The court was unpersuaded by the statement in the JOA that it
" 'shall govern operations on the subject leases after the test well has been
drilled to contract depth,' " stating that the investors' interpretation would
render meaningless other JOA provisions, i.e., that it shall be retroactive to
the date of first operations, including drilling, and the accounting procedures
for the billing of overhead during drilling.229 Consequently, the court held
that the contractual limitations period in the JOA did apply to costs in-
curred and charges made before a well is drilled and completed to the con-
tract depth.230
The court then cited Dotson v. Alamo Funeral Home 231 for the rule that to
226. Id. at 1412 (citing Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324, 327
(Tex. 1984)).
227. Id. at 1412 n.13. Under a turnkey arrangement, the investors paid the operator a fixed
price to drill a test well to a particular depth, rather than a proportionate share of all costs
incurred. Id.
228. Id. at 1412.
229. Id. at 1412-13.
230. Id.
231. 577 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
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establish fraudulent concealment, the investors must show that the operator
had actual knowledge of the facts alleged to be concealed and the fixed pur-
pose to conceal them. 232 Finding no summary judgment proof of an intent
or purpose to actively mislead the investors, the court upheld the lower
court's summary judgment that no limitations period had been tolled by
fraudulent concealment. 233 Finally, the court also found a lack of summary
judgment evidence to support claims that the operator had waived the limi-
tation periods or was equitably estopped to assert them.234
Smith v. L. D. Burns Drilling Co.235 involved a number of claims and
counterclaims between the operator of an oil and gas well and his investors,
as plaintiffs, and an oil and gas drilling contractor, as defendant. 236 On ap-
peal were several summary judgments entered by the trial court.
The first issue addressed by the Waco Court of Appeals was whether
Smith and his investors were joint venturers. The court cited Ayco Develop-
ment Corp. v. G.E. T Service Co. 237 for the elements of a joint venture, 238 and
examined contracts between Smith and his investors for evidence of those
elements. 239 The Joint Operating Agreement granted Smith direct control
of all operations and expressly stated that it was not the intent of the parties
to create, nor should the agreement be construed to create, a joint venture.
In addition, the Subscription Agreement provided for payment by the inves-
tors of a fixed amount for a three percent ownership in the well, and the
Private Placement Memorandum provided that Smith would bear the costs
of drilling and completing the well over that fixed amount per investor. Be-
cause Burns did not assert in any summary judgment pleading that the in-
vestors actually exercised any joint participation, control or operation of the
well, the court, upholding the trial court's summary judgment, held that the
investors were not joint venturers as a matter of law.24°
Having found that the investors and Smith were not joint venturers, and
citing a lack of privity between the investors and Bums, the court also up-
held a summary judgment in favor of Burns on the investors' claims for
damage to the well. 24 1 The court states: "Bums owed no duty, whether
contractual or in tort, to the investors .... [T]he investors cannot individu-
ally pursue claims arising out of Smith's relationship with Burns. '242
232. Calpetco 1981, 989 F.2d at 1413-14.
233. Id. at 1414.
234. Id.
235. 852 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
236. Smith and the investors alleged causes of action for breach of contract, negligence,
gross negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. Burns brought an action
against Smith and the investors for breach of a daywork drilling contract by failure to pay for
services rendered thereunder.
237. 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981).
238. Smith, 852 S.W.2d at 41. The elements are: a community of interest in the venture;
an agreement to share profits; an agreement to share losses; and a mutual right of control or
management of the enterprise. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 42.
242. Id.
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Finally, the court considered Burns claim that the damages sought by
Smith were released or barred by the terms of the daywork drilling con-
tract.24 3 Without determining whether Smith's claims were consequential
and thereby expressly waived under the terms of the contract, 24 4 the court
held that Smith's claims were barred, as a matter of law, by the clause in the
drilling contract providing that "[i]n the event the hole should be lost or
damaged, Operator shall be solely responsible for such damages to or loss of
the hole . . " 245
E. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
1. Gas Purchase Contracts
In HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co.246 the Austin Court of Ap-
peals construed a 1982 gas purchase contract containing a "take-or-pay"
provision requiring the purchaser, Clajon, to purchase, or pay for if available
for delivery and not taken, eighty percent of a daily contract quantity of
gas. 247 If Clajon paid for gas not taken in an accounting period, Clajon
could, in subsequent accounting periods, withhold payment for gas received
in excess of a daily minimum amount. In addition, if Clajon had paid for gas
not taken when the contract expired on December 31, 1984, it could, under
certain conditions over the course of the following year, take an amount of
gas equal to the unrecovered balance of the prepayments. If it was impossi-
ble for Clajon to recover enough gas to make up the prepayment, HECI
could be required to refund the difference. Finally, Clajon agreed to design
and operate a low-pressure pipeline system that would permit HECI to de-
liver gas at a specified maximum wellhead pressure. In 1987 HECI filed suit
against Clajon alleging breach of the take-or-pay provisions and failure to
design and operate the low-pressure pipeline. Clajon filed a counterclaim for
declaratory judgment and pleaded affirmative defenses and failure of a con-
dition precedent.
243. Id.
244. The contract provided: "14.12 Consequential Damages: Neither party shall be liable
to the other for special, indirect or consequential damages resulting from or arising out of this
Contract, including without limitation, loss of profit or business interruptions, however same
may be caused." Id. at 42.
245. Id. at 42.
246. 843 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied). Humble Exploration Com-
pany is HECI's predecessor-in-interest. Id. at 625.
247. The take-or-pay provision provided:
Buyer agrees to receive and purchase, or pay for if available for delivery and not
taken, and Seller agrees to deliver and sell to Buyer from Seller's Gas Reserves,
all subject to the limitations and conditions herein elsewhere provided, during
each Accounting Period, a quantity of Gas Well Gas equal to the aggregate of
the Daily Contract Quantities for each well connected to Buyer's pipeline sys-
tem and for all Gas which Buyer is obligated to accept.
Id. at 630.
"Daily Contract Quantity" is defined as "'eighty percent (80%) of Seller's Delivery Capacity
for [each] well.' .... Seller's Delivery Capacity" was defined in pertinent part as "the maximum
quantity of Gas Well GAS which can be delivered to Buyer ... under and subject to all valid




Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In a series of rulings,
the trial court denied HECI's motions, granted Clajon's motions and entered
judgment that HECI take nothing on its claims against Clajon. 248
In overturning the summary judgment entered by the lower court, the
Austin Court of Appeals held that the contract provisions, read together,
required Clajon to take, or pay for without taking, eighty percent of all gas
HECI could deliver subject to valid conservation rules and regulations of
regulatory authorities. 249 The court rejected, however, Clajon's contention
that its take-or-pay obligation could never exceed eighty percent of the daily
allowable fixed by the Railroad Commission of Texas for each well.2 50 The
court found that the contract did not expressly limit the take-or-pay obliga-
tion in that manner and held that it could not imply that limitation because
daily allowables are not an absolute limit on production; as a well could be
overproduced or underproduced for a period of time to adjust the correlative
rights and opportunities of each owner. 25'
The Austin Court of Appeals also overturned the trial court's holding that
the contract did not require Clajon to take, or pay without taking, any quan-
tities of gas in excess of those quantities which could have been lawfully
taken under the Texas Common Purchaser Act and the Railroad Commis-
sion ratable take requirements. 252 Clajon had failed to adduce summary
judgment proof that the Texas Common Purchaser Act 253 and the ratable
take requirements limited the amount that HECI could produce for the ap-
plicable years, and failed to prove that it took and paid for the maximum
allowable under the act and regulations. 254 The court therefore found it un-
necessary to reach HECI's argument that the Common Purchaser Act and
the Railroad Commission's ratable take requirements were preempted by
federal law.255
The appellate court also held that the lower court had erred in finding that
HECI must, as conditions precedent to Clajon's take-or-pay liability, deter-
248. The court also entered a summary judgment awarding attorneys' fees to Clajon.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 630. The court stated, without supporting authority, that to uphold the sum-
mary judgment, the contract must either explicitly state that the Daily Contract Quantity was
limited to Railroad Commission allowables or that meaning must be drawn by necessary
implication.
251. Id. (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.090 (Vernon Supp. 1992); Valero Trans-
mission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, no writ)). In addition, the court held that even if accepted Clajon's interpretation of the
contract, Clajon had failed to carry its burden of proof that: (1) it had taken eighty percent of
the daily allowable for each well; and (2) that HECI's production had never exceeded the daily
allowables or that HECI balanced its overproduction on one day or in one balancing period
with underproduction in a subsequent day or balancing period. Id.
252. Id. at 631. Article V, Paragraph 12 provided:
12. Nothing in this Contract shall be construed to require Seller to deliver or
Buyer to purchase and receive from Seller or pay Seller for any quantities of Gas
in excess of that which may be produced under the applicable rules, regulations
and orders of regulatory bodies having jurisdiction.
Id. at 631 n.ll.
253. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.081-.097 (Vernon 1993).
254. HECI Exploration Co., 843 S.W.2d at 631.
255. Id.
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mine at the end of each accounting period that Clajon's takes were deficient,
request payment and offer supporting data.256 The contract did not ex-
pressly require an invoice at the end of each accounting and the court re-
fused to construe the contract to impose a condition precedent resulting in a
forfeiture. 257 The court also rejected Clajon's contention that time was of
the essence of the contract, holding that time is not assumed to be of the
essence of every oil and gas transaction, 258 and that the circumstances and
language of the contract did not indicate an intent to make time of the es-
sence for the assertion of a take-or-pay claim. 259 The court also noted that
even if the lower court had been right about the conditions precedent, Clajon
would still not be entitled to prevail as a matter of law, stating that the law
imposes a reasonable time to fulfill a condition precedent in the absence of a
specified time,260 and that what constitutes a reasonable time is a question of
fact. 2 6 1
Finally, the Austin Court of Appeals found that Clajon had failed to
prove as a matter of law that it was not obligated to design and operate a
low-pressure pipeline under the terms of the contract. 262 HECI did not con-
test Clajon's contention that its obligation to construct the pipeline was de-
pendent upon the availability of low-pressure gas.2 6 3 The court held,
however, that Clajon's summary judgment evidence, consisting of technical
gas pressure data without expert or lay testimony to explain and interpret
the data, did not as a matter of law prove the unavailability of low-pressure
256. Id. at 632. The contract provided in pertinent part:
4. At the end of each Accounting period:
a. If Buyer shall have failed to take a quantity of Gas Well Gas equal to the
aggregate of the Daily Contract Quantities required of it hereunder during such
Accounting Period, then Buyer shall pay Seller, in accordance with subpara-
graph b. immediately below, for that quantity of Gas Well Gas equal to the
difference between the aggregate Daily Contract Quantities applicable to such
Accounting period and the sum of (i) any quantities of Gas Well Gas actually
purchased and taken by Buyer From Seller hereunder during such Accounting
Period, and (ii) any quantities of Gas Well Gas which Buyer was not required to
take during such Accounting Period by reason of force majeure (such quantity
resulting from such difference being herein called "deficient taking").
b. If there is deficient taking as determined in subparagraph a. immediately
above, then Buyer shall pay for the deficiency as if taken, such payment to be
made within thirty (30) days after receipt of Seller's request therefor and data
supporting the amount requested. ...
Id.
257. Id. at 633 (citing Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 792 S.W.2d
945, 948 (Tex. 1990)).
258. Id. at 634. The court distinguished Investors Util. Corp. v. Challacombe, 39 S.W.2d
175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, no writ), holding that only time is of the essence in oil and
gas leasing and drilling transactions, unless a contrary intention is stated.
259. Id. at 633-34.
260. Id. (citing Pearcy v. Environmental Conservancy, 814 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1991, writ denied)).
261. Id. (relying upon Price v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ)).





2. Rule of Capture
In Russell v. City of Bryan 265 the Houston Court of Appeals (Fourteenth
District) held that neither the rule of capture nor the statute of limitations
barred an attempt by Russell (and others claiming through her) to establish
title to minerals underlying a ten acre tract of land deeded by her great-
grandfather to the City of Bryan.266
A deed dated 1925 from Tyler Haswell, Russell's great-grandfather, to the
City of Bryan, failed to expressly state whether Haswell intended to convey a
fee simple or merely the surface rights to the tract.267 In 1981, the City
leased the mineral interests to North Central Oil Corporation, who pooled
the tract with other acreage and produced oil and gas from a well located off
of the disputed tract. Seven years later, Russell sued both the City of Bryan
and North Central, contending that the City of Bryan owned the surface
estate only and claiming ownership of the oil and gas attributable to the
acreage.
The court first addressed the question of limitations, reversing a summary
judgment granted against Russell on that issue.268 The court held that
although Russell had constructive notice in 1981 that the City intended to
lease minerals underlying the disputed tract, by virtue to a legal notice pub-
lished in a local newspaper, the notice was sufficient only to bar the claims of
subsequent purchasers. 269
The court then addressed the trial court's second ground for summary
judgment, i.e., that the rule of capture is an absolute defense to liability. The
court cited Halbouty v. Railroad Commission of Texas 270 for the rule that
"[d]ue to the 'fugitive' nature of hydrocarbons, when captured they 'belong
to the owner of the well to which they flowed, irrespective of where they may
have been in place originally, without liability to his neighbor for dam-
age.' ",271 This longstanding rule would seem to dispose of the case. The
producing well for the pooled acreage is located off the tract deeded to the
City of Bryan by Haswell, and any minerals underlying that tract that may
have been drained by the producing well would legitimately belong to the
264. Id. The court also held that Clajon failed to establish as a matter of law the absence of
fact issues relating to one or more of the elements of HECI's claim. Id.
265. 846 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
266. Id. at 390. The lower court had entered summary judgment in favor of the City of
Bryan on affirmative defenses.
267. The deed consistently used the term "dedicate" to describe the grant.
268. Id. at 391. The trial court had previously entered a summary judgment that the Has-
well deed did not retain an interest in the mineral estate. That summary judgment was also
overturned on appeal. See Russell v. City of Bryan, 797 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
269. Russell, 846 S.W.2d at 391 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6631 (Vernon
1969)). In addition, the court ruled that Russell's summary judgment affidavit had raised the
"rule of discovery" to prevent summary judgment on the question of limitations. Id.
270. 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364, 375, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
271. Russell, 846 S.W.2d at 391.
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owners of that well. The court held, however, that the rule of capture does
not apply to production from land within a pooled unit. The court stated:
[The City of Bryan] agreed to pool disputed tract with other land; ac-
cordingly, [it] received the disputed tract's share of distributions from
the pool's production, and no hydrocarbons were "captured."... If it is
determined at trial that grantor "dedicated" surface rights only to City,
appellants have been prevented from exercising their rights as owners of
the mineral estate, and appellees have wrongfully received the proceeds
of appellants' share of production income under the pooling
agreement. 272
In In re Hawn 273 debtor John Hawn obtained a loan from a bank secured
by his oil and gas properties in Texas. The parties executed a security agree-
ment 274 and the Bank perfected its lien, as a real property mortgage and a
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 security interest. 275 A second bank
succeeded to the first bank's interest, 276 and loaned Hawn an additional
$100,000, secured by additional oil and gas properties in Texas. 277
Several years after the banking transactions, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice 278 filed a Notice of Tax Lien in Nueces County assessing a 100% pen-
alty for earlier personal income taxes. The IRS eventually attempted to levy
Hawn's taxes and penalties from his bank, who received all oil and gas reve-
nue attributable to Hawn's interest. The IRS conceded that the bank held a
prior lien against oil and gas in the ground, but challenged the priority of the
bank's lien against the oil and gas as produced.
The Bankruptcy Court held that the security instruments gave the bank a
valid first priority security interest in the oil and gas in the ground and a
valid first priority interest in any oil and gas produced.279 Therefore, the
bank had a "single continuous security interest that attached as a real estate
lien while the minerals are in the ground and is converted into a Uniform
Commercial Code security interest at the moment minerals are ex-
272. Id. at 391-92. The court cites no supporting authority for its conclusion that the rule
of capture is inapplicable to the case, stating that "none of the cases cited by appellees involve
a situation in which a court has applied the Rule of Capture to property in a pooled unit." Id.
Nor does the court cite support for its holding that if Russell and those claiming through her
are found to own the minerals underlying the disputed tract, they would be entitled to a share
of production income under the pooling agreement. Id. The authors suggest that there are a
number of Texas cases which have applied the rule of capture in situations of voluntarily
pooled or unitized tracts, holding that a non-drillsite owner whose interest has not been volun-
tarily pooled may not recover any share of production from the unit. See, e. g., Sun Explora-
tion and Prod. Co. v. Pitzer, 822 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied);
Donnan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 732 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ
denied); and Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966).
273. 149 B.R. 450 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993)
274. The agreement was entitled "Mortgage, Deed of Trust, Security Agreement, Assign-
ment and Financing Statement." [hereinafter "Security Agreement"].
275. The assignment was publicly recorded in Refugio County, Texas.
276. American National recorded the transaction in Refugio County, Texas.
277. In 1986 Hawn and American National executed a "Transfer Order" whereby Hawn's
proceeds from the wells were paid directly to the Bank by Hewit & Dougherty, the operator.
278. Hereinafter "IRS."
279. Id. at 455 (citing U.C.C. § 9-401(a)(2) and stating that "[o]il and gas in the ground
thus is precisely the same property as oil and gas after extraction.").
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tracted. ' '280 The court rejected the argument that rule of capture negated
Hawn's ownership of oil and gas in place.28' Citing Stephens Co. v. Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas Co. ,282 the court held that the fact that Hawn could con-
ceivably lose title to some oil and gas by drainage and the rule of capture
does not alter his full vested ownership interest of the oil and gas in place. 28 3
3. Partnerships
In McAlpin v. Sanchez28 4 a geologist and landman formed an oral partner-
ship to acquire and develop oil and gas leasehold properties. Pursuant to the
terms of their oral partnership agreement, after obtaining an oil and gas
lease, they sold 75 percent of the leasehold interest to non-partner investors
under letter agreements. The letter agreements stated they were not in-
tended to create a partnership or joint venture, and provided that if a well
became a commercial producer, a joint operating agreement would control.
Additional leases were obtained, 75 percent of those leases were sold to non-
partner investors, and the new leases were added to the "contract area" cov-
ered by the joint operating agreement.
After a complex series of transactions and disputes between the partners,
the partnership was dissolved. Prior to the dissolution, McAlpin (the
landman partner) and his wife obtained several oil and gas leaseholds in
their own names which were not assigned to the partnership. MacGregor
(the geologist partner) and the non-partnership investors filed suit, asking
the trial court to declare the interests of the parties under the partnership,
letter agreements and joint operating agreement and to impose a construc-
tive trust upon two leases, covering 50 and 65.5 acre tracts, acquired by the
McAlpins but not assigned to the partnership. 285 The jury generally found
in favor of the plaintiffs, 28 6 and the trial court imposed a constructive trust
upon both the 50 and 65.5 acre tracts leased by the defendants. On appeal,
the McAlpins argued that the imposition of the constructive trust in favor of
the investors, as opposed to McGregor, was improper.
Construing the undisputed terms of the partnership agreement, the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court im-
posing a constructive trust in favor of the investors, as well as McGregor. 28 7
The court cited Ginther v. Taub 288 for the proposition that a constructive
trust is a legal fiction, arising in equity, to prevent a wrongdoer from profit-
280. Id. at 455 (citing In re Hess, 61 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)).
281. Id.
282. 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
283. Hawn, 149 B.R. at 455.
284. 858 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
285. The McAlpins also counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment with regard to the
interests of the parties in two additional leases, fraud by the investors, clouding of their title to
leases and for drainage.
286. The jury found that the McAlpins made fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations
and breached duties owed to McGregor, but found that the investors were estopped to com-
plain of the McAlpins' actions, although this finding was disregarded by the trial court. The
jury found against the McAlpins on their counterclaims.
287. McAlpin, 858 S.W.2d at 506.
288. 675 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1984).
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ing from his wrongful acts.289 While the court did not hold that McAlpin
owed a fiduciary duty to anyone other than his partner McGregor, it deter-
mined that a constructive trust was an appropriate method to enforce
McAlpin's duty, under the express (albeit oral) terms of the partnership
agreement, to sell 75 percent all partnership leases to the investors. 290 How-
ever, the court took exception to the judgment of the trial court insofar as it
required the parties' interests under the trust to reflect the pro rata interest
of each party under the joint operating agreement,29I holding that "rights
and duties incident to a joint operating agreement only arise during transac-
tions relative to lands and leases expressly covered by the agreement. '292
The leases which were the subject of the constructive trust had been pro-
posed but never acquired by the partnership, had never been made a part of
the "contract area" of the joint operating agreement, and so were not subject
to the terms of that agreement. 293 Since McAlpin owed no duty to the inves-
tors under the joint operating agreement, the judgment was modified to re-
flect the parties' interests under the oral partnership agreement. 294
II. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
The 73d Texas Legislature considered and passed numerous laws that di-
rectly and indirectly affect the production, transportation and storage of oil,
gas and minerals in Texas. This portion of the Article addresses only those
laws that have a direct impact on Texas oil, gas and mineral law, and does
not review collateral issues such as new tax laws on oil and gas interests and
properties, or environmental laws affecting oil and gas interests.295 Taxa-
tion, environment, and miscellaneous laws collaterally affecting oil, gas and
minerals, are covered by other articles in the SMU Annual Survey issue.
This section combines a discussion and analysis of bills passed by both the
Texas Senate and the House of Representatives that have become laws. 29 6
The last segment of this portion of the article lists those laws that indirectly
relate to oil, gas and minerals, but do not directly impact those issues ad-
dressed in the "Judicial Developments" portion of the Article.297




293. Id. at 508 (citing Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977); Fugua v. Taylor,
683 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
294. Id. Under the partnership agreement, McAlpin and McGregor would each own 12.5
percent of the leases and the remaining 75 percent would be sold to investors in percentages to
be determined at the time of sale.
295. See infra pp. 1479-81.
296. See infra pp. 1474-79.
297. See infra pp. 1479-81 wherein the laws are listed that only indirectly affect the oil and
gas issues upon which this article concentrates.
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A. LAWS: OIL, GAS & MINERALS
1. Leasing State-Owned Lands
The Texas Legislature 298 amended Section 32.002 and subsequent sections
of the Natural Resources Code affecting the sale, lease and development of
state-owned lands299 for the exploration, development and production of oil,
gas and other minerals. 300 The act permits for the solicitation of bids to
lease state-owned lands and establishes the terms for such leasing. 301 At a
minimum, the lease must provide for a 1/8th royalty on gross production
and a bonus of at least $10 per acre. 30 2 The bidder must submit a separate
bid for each separate tract to be leased. 30 3 Each lease granted shall be for a
primary term not to exceed ten years.3°4 The Bill also covers reworking and
shut-in procedures, the effect of litigation involving a lease, leasing riverbeds
and channels, lease ratifications, and lease forfeiture. 305
2. Railroad Commission Hearings
The legislature only passed one law with a direct impact upon Texas Rail-
road Commission hearings. Senate Bill No. 141 amends Section 86.085 of
the Natural Resources Code concerning statewide hearings to determine
market demand and the potential volume of gas to be produced in a given
period. 30 6 The new law is significant and, therefore, is set out in full below:
On or before the 25th day of each month, the commission, after notice
and hearing, shall determine: (1) the lawful market demand for gas to
be produced from each reservoir during the following month; and (2)
the volume of gas that can be produced without waste from the reser-
voir and each well in the reservoir during the following month.30 7
Because of the significance of this legislation, it became effective May 24,
1993, unlike other oil and gas related legislation that did not take effect until
September 1, 1993.308
3. Pipelines
Two acts were passed by the legislature concerning pipelines. 30 9 First, the
legislature passed a bill authorizing limited partnerships to act as common
298. Hereinafter the "legislature."
299. The existing legislation in this section of the Natural Resources Code specifically sets
forth the lands to which this section does not apply.
300. See Tex. S.B. 962, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
301. Id.
302. Id. (TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1072(1) & (2) (Vernon 1993)). See also
§ 52.022 requiring a royalty rate on production of not less than "one-eight of the gross produc-
tion or the market value of the oil and gas produced." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.022
(Vernon 1993).
303. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.015 (a).
304. Id. § 52.021.
305. Id. §§ 52.023-53.162.
306. See Tex. S.B. 141, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Tex. S.B. 467, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) and Tex. S.B. 1680, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
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carrier pipelines. 310 The limited partnerships may transport oil, oil prod-
ucts, gas, carbon dioxide, salt brine, fuller's earth, sand, clay, liquefied min-
erals and other minerals set forth in Sections 111.019 through 111.022 of the
Natural Resources Code.3 1'
In Senate Bill No. 467, the legislature increased the penalty for pipeline
safety violations from $10,000 per violation to $25,000 per violation, with a
maximum civil penalty of $500,000.312 The State Attorney General is au-
thorized to enforce this provision to ensure that transporters of gas or pipe-
line facility operators maintain safe operations. 31 3
4. Creation of the Petroleum Storage Tank Advisory Committee
Vernon's annotated civil statutes have been amended to create the Petro-
leum Storage Tank Advisory Committee, with nine committee members to
"provide technical expertise to the [Railroad] commission regarding petro-
leum storage tanks and shall advise the commission in the adoption of rules
pertaining to the commission's petroleum storage tank program ... and for
the licensing and regulation of installers and corrective action specialists. '3 14
The law specifies the persons who shall serve as the nine committee mem-
bers, all of whom are appointed by the governor. Those persons include:
three (3) persons with experience in operating underground storage tanks;
one (1) professional engineer; three (3) with experience in the installation of
underground petroleum storage tanks; one (1) from the financial industry
with experience in underground storage tank corrective action; and one
member with experience in environmental protection, fire protection, or the
operation and maintenance of underground storage tanks, who is not other-
wise eligible for a license to operate an underground storage tank. 315 No
more than three (3) of the committee members are to come from a single
metropolitan area.31 6
5. Underground Storage Facilities
Establishing that the Texas Railroad Commission has authority over natu-
ral gas underground storage3 17 facilities, and authority over surface and sub-
surface equipment used for the underground storage of gas, the legislature
passed House Bill No. 2622.3 18 The act does not apply to a storage facility
that is regulated by the United States Department of Transportation utiliz-
310. Tex. S.B. 680, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (amending § 1.09 of the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon 1993)).
311. Tex. S.B. 680, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
312. Tex. S.B. 467, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
313. Id.
314. See Tex. H.B. 1938, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
315. Id. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8900 (Vernon 1993).
316. Id.
317. See Tex. H.B. 2622, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (now TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
6053-3). The act defines natural gas underground storage: as "the storage of natural gas be-




ing its authority under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act. 3 19
The purpose of this legislation is to establish safety standards and prac-
tices, provide for inspection and examination of storage facilities, require
routine reports, imposing civil and administrative penalties, and to limit the
powers of municipalities and counties in regulating these kinds of facili-
ties.320 As part of the safety standards, the Commission is authorized to
require all owners and/or operators of underground storage facilities to in-
stall safety devices, establish fire prevention procedures, educate employees
in the safety and emergency procedures, and initiate procedures to prevent
the release of hazardous substances that would be harmful to the public. 32 1
Failure to comply with this act will result in civil and possibly administrative
penalties. 322
6. Salt Dome Storage Facilities
In response to continued problems with leaks and explosions of salt dome
storage facilities, House Bill No. 2016 created a new section of the Natural
Resources Code.323 The act covers the storage of hazardous liquids in salt
dome storage facilities.3 24 As with the natural gas storage act enacted by the
73d Legislature, the Act does not cover storage facilities governed by the
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act,3 25 and prohibits local governments
from enacting ordinances that conflict with the Act.3 2 6
The Act enables the Commission to inspect and examine salt dome stor-
age facilities, and to require reports concerning the construction, operation
and maintenance of the facility.3 27 Failure to comply with the Commission's
orders may result in civil and administrative penalties. 328 Persons or entities
desiring to contest the assessment of penalties may challenge them by com-
plying with the procedures set forth in the Act.329
7. Aggregate Quarries and Pits
In order to minimize the potential hazards that quarries and pits may
cause if they are located near a roadway, the legislature amended Sections
133.003(13), (24), (25) and (26) of the Natural Resources Code. 330 The Act
319. Id. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act regulates interstate pipeline facilities. 49
U.S.C. §§ 1671-1680.
320. See Tex. H.B. 2622, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See Tex. H.B. 2016, 73d Leg., R.S. (now TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 211.001
(Vernon 1993)).
324. Id. The act defines a "hazardous liquid" natural gas product to include petroleum or
any petroleum or liquid natural gas product and any hydrocarbon in a liquid state. Id. The
"salt dome storage of hazardous liquids" means "the storage of a hazardous liquid in any salt
formation or bedded salt formation storage facility .... " Id.
325. 49 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2111.
326. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 211.002(a)-(c) (Vernon 1993).
327. Id. §§ 211.013 & 211.014 (Vernon 1993).
328. Id. §§ 211.031 & 211.033.
329. Id. § 211.033.
330. See Tex. H.B. 1968, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
1476 [Vol. 47
OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW
specifies where the quarry or pit must be located, requires that the
owner/operator obtain a safety certificate, and assigns responsibilities for
abandoned or inactive pits.331 A "roadway" is defined in the Act as "the
part of the public road intended for vehicular traffic that consists of an im-
proved driving surface constructed of concrete, asphalt, compacted soil,
rock, or other material." 332
Abandoned or inactive pits must have a barrier between the public road
and the pit if the pit is located in an unsafe location. 333 The Commission
may grant waivers from the barrier requirement if the owner/operator sub-
mits an application showing that a governmental entity obtained a right-of-
way and constructed the roadway before August 25, 1991, and the pit has
remained abandoned or inactive since the roadway was constructed. 334 Fi-
nally, the Act requires a safety certificate for all active, inactive and aban-
doned quarries and pits.335
8 Salvage of Equipment for Wells Plugged by the State
House Bill number 2705 amends the Natural Resources Code to provide
additional regulations relating to the State's authority to plug wells that pose
environmental hazards. 336 This Act entitles the State to plug wells that are
inactive and are leaking substances that "cause a serious threat of pollution
or injury to the public health . . . -337 The Commission is required to first
give notice to the operator of the well that the Commission intends to plug
the well and salvage all equipment associated with the well. 338
If the Commission plugs the well, it has a first lien on the equipment asso-
ciated with the well and may maintain a cause of action for all reasonable
expenses incurred in plugging the well. 339 "The commission shall dispose of
well-site equipment or hydrocarbons under this section at a price or value
that reflects the generally recognized market value of the equipment or hy-
drocarbons, with allowances for physical condition. ' '34° Any monies recov-
ered by the Commission from the sale of such equipment is to be deposited
into the "oil-field cleanup fund. ' 341 Owner/operators may file a claim for
funds against the "oil-field cleanup fund," by following the procedures set
forth in the Act.34 2
9. Liability for Plugging Abandoned or Non-Producing Wells
An owner/operator who sells a well that was in compliance with the
331. Id.
332. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 133.003(24) (Vernon 1993).
333. Id. § 133.041(b).
334. Id.
335. Id. § 133.045.
336. See Tex. H.B. 2705, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
337. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 89.043(b) (Vernon 1993).
338. Id. §§ 89.043(c), (d) & (e).
339. Id. §§ 89.083(a)-(j).
340. Id. § 89.085.
341. Id. § 89.085(d).
342. Id. §§ 89.086 & 89.087.
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Commission's rules regarding the plugging of a well that has been aban-
doned or ceased operation, passes the duty to correctly plug the well to the
person or entity that acquires the right to operate and/or control the well.343
If, however, at the time the well is sold, the owner/operator is not in compli-
ance with the Commission's regulations, that owner/operator may still be
liable for violations relating to the plugging of the well. 3 "
10. Miscellaneous
a. Pipeline Easements
Senate Bill No. 172 added Section 111.0194 to the Natural Resources
Code concerning the width of pipeline easements.345 Specifically, any pipe-
line easement "created through grant or through the power of eminent do-
main ... is presumed to create an easement in favor of the common carrier
pipeline . . . that extends only a width of 50 feet as to each pipeline laid
under the grant or judgment in eminent domain prior to January 1,
1994."346 The Act does not apply to pipeline easements that rare granted
under the terms of oil and leases authorizing the construction of gathering
lines.347 A party may rebut the fifty-foot easement requirement by showing
that a greater width is reasonably needed. 348
b. Regulation of Compressed Natural Gas & Liquefied Natural Gas
To "protect the health, safety, and welfare of the general public," the leg-
islature authorized the Commission to adopt standards relating to "the work
of compression and liquefaction, storage, sale or dispensing, transfer or
transportation, use or consumption, and disposal of compressed natural gas
or liquefied natural gas."' 349 Prior to engaging in any activity regarding com-
pressed natural gas or liquefied natural gas, all persons or entities must ob-
tain a license from the Commission.350 If a license is granted, appropriate
workers' compensation insurance coverage is required, plus any other type
of insurance coverage required by the Commission. 35t The Commission
343. Tex. H.B. 2484, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (section 89.002 of the Natural Resources Code).
344. Id.
345. See Tex. H.B. 172, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.0194
(Vernon 1993)).
346. Id. § 111.0194(a) (emphasis added).
347. Id. § 111.0194(b).
348. Id. § 111.0194(c). Specifically, reasons listed in the statute for an extension of the 50-
foot easement include those "for purposes of operation, construction of additional lines under
the grant . . . maintenance, repair, replacement, safety, surveillance or as a buffer zone for
protection of the safe operation of the common carrier pipeline .. " Id.
349. See Tex. S.B. 576, 73d Leg., R.S. (now TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 116.001
(Vernon 1993)). The Act defines "compressed natural gas" as "natural gas primarily consist-
ing of methane in a gaseous state that is compressed and used, stored, sold, transported, or
distributed for use by or through a CNG system." Id. § 116.001 (2). "Liquefied natural gas"
is defined as "natural gas primarily consisting of methane in liquid or semisolid state." Id.
§ 116.001 (3).
350. Id. § 116.031.
351. Id. § 116.036.
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may suspend or revoke a license if it finds violations or noncompliance. 352
"Any party to a proceeding before the commission is entitled to judicial re-
view under the substantial evidence rule."
'35 3
B. TAXATION LAWS
1. House Bills 354
a. Tex. H.B. 925, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 998).
Amending chapter 23 of the Tax Code to provide that for ad valorem tax
appraisal purposes, the future value of oil and gas interests must be based on
the average price for product produced during the preceding calendar year.
b. Tex. H.B. 1735, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 403).
Amending Subchapter B Chapter 23 of the Tax Code to provide that for
ad valorem tax appraisal purposes, the appraiser must consider the cost of
remediation of existing or potential environmental damage.
c. Tex. H.B. 1920, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 285).
Amending Subchapter B, Chapter 11 of the Tax Code to exempt pollution
control property from taxation.
d. Tex. H.B. 1974, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 1014).
Amending the Tax Code by adding Chapter 204 providing for a $10,000
severance tax credit for new field discovery wells, if at least 521 such wells
are drilled in 1994, and $25,000 per well if at least 721 such wells are drilled
in 1994. A credit of $25,000 for each additional well in such new fields will
apply if at least 842 discovery wells are spudded in 1994.
e. Tex. H.B. 1975, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 1015).
Amending Section 202.052 of the Tax Code to provide a severance tax
exemption for production from wells which have been inactive for three
years.
f. Tex. H.B. 2007, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 1016).
Relating to the regulation of liquified petroleum gas and of the inspection
and testing of liquified petroleum gas meters; providing penalties.
g. Tex. H.B. 2723, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 958).
Severance tax credit for "co-production" projects. [Compare to S.B. 100].
352. Id. § 116.037.





a. Tex. S.B. 466, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 335).
Enhanced Oil Recovery severance tax relief. [Compare to H.B. 1084].
b. Tex. S.B. 548, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 667).
Venue for protest of appraised value for multicounty pipelines. [Compare
to H.B. 1645].
c. Tex. S.B. 894, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 588).




a. Tex. H.B. 923, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 793).
Creates an Energy Environmental Economic Policy Committee which is
charged with an obligation to develop a comprehensive long term state en-
ergy policy.
b. Tex. H.B. 1431, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 528).
Amending Chapter 502 of the Health and Safety Code to expand require-
ments for compliance with OSHA Hazard Communication standards re-
garding duty to provide employees with accessibility to information
regarding hazardous chemicals. A workplace chemical list and MSDS infor-
mation is required for hazardous chemicals used or stored in excess of 55
gallons or 500 pounds.
c. Tex. H.B. 2049, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 485).
Relating to the representation of the general public on the Natural Re-
source Conservation Commission, the confidentiality of information submit-
ted to The Texas Air Control Board, and the effective administration of air
quality permitting programs, including compliance with Federal Clean Air
Act requirements.
d. Tex. H.B. 2623, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 810).
Amending Section 401.003 of the Health and Safety Code to define and
include NORM, and giving the Water Commission jurisdiction over disposal
of same generated during oil and gas production.
e. Tex. H.B. 2822, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 883).
To add Chapter 113.2435 to the Natural Resources Code to provide that
355. Hereinafter "S.B."
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the Commission may establish consumer rebate programs for purchases of
appliances and equipment fueled by LPG or other environmentally benefi-
cial alternative fuels.
2 Senate Bills
a. Tex. S.B. 271, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 394).
Amending Sections 113.241 and 113.243 of the Natural Resources Code
to permit the Railroad Commission to "implement conservation and distri-
bution plans to minimize the frequency and severity of disruptions in the
supply of alternative fuels."
b. Tex. S.B. 468, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 28).
Carbon Dioxide pipeline safety regulation. [Compare to H.B. 843].
c. Tex. S.B. 737, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 603).
Amending Section 113.241 of the Natural Resources Code to list natural
gas as an "environmentally beneficial alternative fuel" eligible for research
and promotion funding.
d. Tex. S.B. 1043, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 992).
Amending Chapter 401 of the Health and Safety Code to give the Texas
Natural Resource Commission jurisdiction over regulation of radioactive
source material recovery, processing and disposal.
e. Tex. S.B. 1049, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 776).
Prevention and cleanup of oil spills. [Same as H.B. 2188].
f. Tex. S.B. 1334, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 914).
Amending Chapter 28.011 give the authority to the Water Commission to
regulate the distribution of underground water.
D. MISCELLANEOUS LAWS
1. House bills
a. Tex. H.B. 520, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 966).
Relating to the exclusion from coverage under the Texas Unemployment
Compensation Act of services performed by certain landmen.
2. Senate Bills
a. Tex. S.B. 83, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 660).
Relating to the payment date of certain public utility assessments and util-
ity service and related service provided by or to the state agency or institu-
tion, or a local government.
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b. Tex. S.B. 420, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 664).
Relating to requiring a gas utility to refund illegal or unlawful compensa-
tion collected by the utility.
c. Tex. S.B. 498, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 859).
Public Utility Commission Sunset Reauthorization Bill - This lengthy bill
makes a number of substantive changes in agency procedure and jurisdic-
tion. The partial deregulation of independent electric co-ops is of interest to
oil and gas producers, who often pay rural electric co-ops a price for electric-
ity which substantially exceeds the cost-of-service, and thereby subsidizes
residential ratepayers in the service area. The proposed change would pro-
vide less PUC oversight in ratemaking review. There is special protection
for any affected customer or group of customers which consume(s) at least
ten percent of a utility's annual energy sales to any customer class - such
customer or customer group is entitled to request PUC review of rates
charged for service.
d. Tex. S.B. 640, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 412).
Amending Section 66.73(a) of the Education Code to increase fees
charged for filing copies of assignments of oil and gas leases issued by the
Board for Lease of University Lands.
e. Tex. S.B. 779, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 80).
Relating to liability of a licensed installer or servicer of certain liquified
petroleum gas systems.
f. Tex. S.B. 966, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (Ch. 630).
Amending Section 111.019 of the Natural Resources Code to require that
Common Carriers exercising the right of eminent domain shall have a duty
to disclose to the landowner copies of the same tariffs and MSDS sheets
concerning commodities to be transported as are required by agencies and
statutes, and to require common carriers to send copies of spill reports to
affected landowners by certified mail.
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